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Institutions play a key role in development and output. Much of the literature on
institutions has looked at the effects of institutions on development and output rather
than the effects of institutions on individual behavior. This dissertation explores the
effect of institutional stimuli on individual behavior. The first study explores the
effectiveness of grassroots monitoring as opposed to top-down monitoring as a means
of deterring corruption. Using Olken (2007), we argue that the presence of effective
top-down monitoring alternatives can actually undermine pro-social behavior among
individuals by crowding out their incentives to monitor. We find that in villages with
both an audit and grassroots monitoring, individuals are less likely to attend, talk,
and actively participate in accountability meetings. Analyzing a purely grassroots
versus a purely top-down monitoring strategy, we find that grassroots monitoring can
be as effective as auditing in reducing missing expenditures when controlling for elite
capture. The second study examines how police violence affects institutional trust.
I find that 911 call volume in a police district decreases by about 11 calls after an
officer-involved shooting in that district. For black victims in predominately black
police beats, 911 call volume falls by about 18 calls after a shooting. Further analysis
of this effect in both Chicago and at the national level suggests that the “shocks” to
institutional trust while significant are short-lived and only affect confidence in the
police or the justice system. I conclude with an examination of the particular salient
fatal encounter where LaQuan McDonald died at the hands of police. I find that
the release of the dash cam footage depicting McDonald’s death leads to persistent
iii
falls in daily 911 calls and CTA rides. The dash cam footage release also leads to an
increase in police conducting investigatory stops, as well.
iv
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Trust in institutions and engagement with institutions are complementary ideas. For
an individual to engage with or make use of an institution the individual must trust
the institution to serve its purpose. If an individual knows a government institution
will serve its purpose, this may disincentive an individual to participate in work that
serves a similar purpose. Thus, an institution could crowd out private incentives to
engage in pro-social behavior. However, if trust in an institution is eroded, individuals
may cease to use or engage with the institution. This in turn, could hamper the
institution’s ability to function and further exacerbate the problem.
This dissertation combines the ideas of institutions and civic engagement and
trust. The first chapter examines how top-down monitoring affects incentives for
individuals to engage in bottom-up monitoring of corruption. This chapter shows
that in the presence of top-down monitoring schemes, bottom-up monitoring is less
effective. However, taken on its own, bottom-up monitoring can be as effective as top-
down monitoring. If an bottom-up monitoring scheme can control for elite capture,
it can stand alone as a valid deterrent to corruption.
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Chapter two examines the effect of fatal encounters on trust in the police. This
chapter shows that self-reported confidence in the police and 911 calls fall after an
area’s exposure to fatal encounters between police and citizens. In general, the effect
on 911 calls is short lived, though for particularly salient fatal encounters, the effect
is more long-term.
Chapter two presents Monitoring Corruption: Can Top-down Monitoring
Crowd-Out Grassroots Participation?, chapter three presents The Impact of
Fatal Encounters on Trust in the Police, chapter four concludes.
2
Chapter 2




1This manuscipt was created by Matthew Harvey with the help of Dr. Robert Gonzalez and
Foeteini Tzachrista. At the time of submission it has yet to be published.
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2.1 Introduction
Corruption can flourish when citizens are disenfranchised. This has motivated policies
that promote community monitoring as a means of combating corruption. In theory,
bolstering grassroots monitoring may be more effective in reducing corruption than
increasing top-down monitoring efforts: compared to government auditors, ordinary
citizens may have better, first-hand information on the extent of corruption in their
communities, as well as stronger incentives to monitor and hold officials accountable.
In practice, the empirical evidence is mixed. While Bjorkman and Svensson (2009)
find that government performance improves when community members engage in the
accountability process, Olken 2007, A. V. Banerjee et al. 2010, and more recently
Raffler, Posner, and Parkerson 2019, find limited support for the idea that increas-
ing community monitoring results in better behavior by public officials.2 Several
mechanisms may explain the latter: grassroots monitoring has little potential in the
presence of free-riding and elite capture Olken (2007); or if community members lack
plausible deniability or means of directly reporting and punishing corrupt officials
Chassang and Miquel (2018); or if they simply cannot properly detect corruption
Olken (2009).3
This paper proposes an alternative channel: the crowding-out of individuals’ in-
centives to participate in community monitoring resulting from effective top-down
monitoring alternatives. In other words, we argue that a potential explanation for
the ambiguous findings in the literature is that the presence of effective and credible
2Other examples of papers studying a similar question and finding both positive and mixed re-
sults on the effect of community monitoring are: Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman 2009; Attanasio
et al. 2012; Pradhan et al. 2014; A. Banerjee et al. 2018; Gonzalez and Komisarow 2020
3Elite capture refers to measures taken by officials that potentially thwart the monitoring ability
of citizens. For example, taking over complaints sent to an anti-corruption hotline. In the case
of Olken 2007, elite capture occurred via the funneling of invitations to accountability meetings to
individuals that were sympathetic to the village heads.
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top-down monitoring can undermine citizen participation in grassroots monitoring
efforts.
We explore this mechanism empirically by building on seminal work by Olken
2007. Olken 2007 conducted a randomized controlled field experiment involving over
600 Indonesian road-building projects. These projects were vulnerable to corruption
in the form of missing expenditures in the road-building projects. Villages were ran-
domly assigned into three possible monitoring interventions: audits conducted by a
central government agency, invitations to village accountability meetings, and a com-
bination of invitations and anonymous comment forms. The last two were grassroots
interventions while the audit treatment was a top-down, centralized approach. In this
work, Olken 2007 concluded that although the audit intervention was quite successful
in reducing missing expenditures, the grassroots interventions had limited success.
We take advantage of the fact that these treatments were independently assigned
(and assignment was common knowledge to villagers), to explore how community
monitoring behavior among villagers and missing expenditures respond to the grass-
roots interventions in the presence (and absence) of audits. In spite of the small
sample size in the original experiment, we uncover that the effectiveness of bottom-
up monitoring is significantly undermined by whether the village also had an audit
intervention in place. Specifically, we find that grassroots monitoring leads to a statis-
tically significant decrease in the share of missing expenditures of 8 to 10 percentage
points in non-audit villages while the effect is close to zero in magnitude in audit
villages. Interestingly, the grassroots effect in non-audit villages is comparable to the
effect of the audits. In fact, when analyzing a purely grassroots or purely top-down
monitoring strategy, we find that grassroots monitoring is (i) as effective as auditing
in reducing corruption, and (ii) almost three times as cost-effective as auditing.
We find considerable evidence of audits undermining participation: individuals are
less likely to attend, talk, and actively participate in accountability meetings if they
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live in an audit village. They are also significantly less likely to voice general problems,
corruption-related problems, and to take serious actions to address these problems.
In contrast, individuals were 5% more likely to attend accountability meetings, about
6% more likely to participate and talk during these meetings, 14% more likely to voice
project-related problems, and 27% more likely to voice corruption-related problems
in non-audit villages relative to audit villages. Villages are also more proactive and
responsive to community monitoring in the absence of audits: the likelihood of taking
serious actions in response to problems raised during the accountability meetings more
than doubled in non-audit villages.
In a set of additional results, we find that the grassroots intervention seems to be
less disruptive in terms of substitutions across corrupt offenses. Specifically, although
audits lead officials to substitute from theft to nepotism, as documented by Olken
2007), grassroots interventions do not. In the absence of audits, we find no evidence
that family members of project heads or village officials are more likely to be employed
if a grassroots intervention is in place. Differences in the nature of the monitoring
technologies (external centralized audits versus “internal” participatory monitoring)
can potentially explain this differential results on cross-corruption substitutions.
We proceed by presenting an illustrative model to help understand the mecha-
nisms behind the documented drop in participation in the presence of an audit. We
discuss the following mechanisms: (i) non-pivotal participation: the perception that
an individual’s marginal participation in the accountability process is non-pivotal in
the presence of an effective audit, (ii) retaliation costs: audits can affect how indi-
viduals perceive the potential for retaliation from publicly voicing complaints, (iii)
different public returns to audits and participation: benefits in the quality of roads
from lower malfeasance can differ depending on whether this was achieved via audits
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or grassroots interventions,4 and to a lesser extent, (iv) whether the distribution of
pro-social norms across villages may vary with audits. Despite data limitations, we
present quantitative and contextual evidence suggesting that the non-pivotal partic-
ipation channel is a plausible explanation for why top-down monitoring can depress
participation.
We note that this paper cannot answer whether top-down and bottom-up moni-
toring are substitutes or complements of each other. The data simply do not allow to
fully answer this question: since the same audit likelihood and intensity was imple-
mented regardless of community monitoring or not, one can only answer how commu-
nity monitoring responds to the presence of audits but not the opposite. In spite of
sample size limitations, this paper presents evidence that top-down monitoring in the
form of an external, high intensity, and credible audit, lowers the corruption-deterring
effect of community monitoring and depresses participation by ordinary citizens in
accountability efforts.
This paper contributes to a broad literature on the effectiveness of monitoring
strategies (e.g., Olken 2007, Ferraz and Finan 2008, Bjorkman and Svensson 2009,
Serra 2011, Callen and Long 2015). Specifically, this paper sheds light on the question
of whether policies that combine top-down and bottom-up monitoring are effective.
We show that an unintended consequence of these policies is that top-down monitor-
ing can actually undermine rather than complement grassroots efforts. With this in
mind, this paper adds to recent work delving deeper into the effectiveness of com-
munity interventions and what mechanisms can explain the pitfalls of some of these
interventions (e.g., Raffler, Posner, and Parkerson 2019).
Our paper shows that the crowding out of citizens’ incentives to engage and partic-
ipate can result from mechanisms other than the typical material incentives previously
4For instance, audits and grassroots participation can lead to an equivalent overall drop in
malfeasance. However, the drop in audit villages may result mostly from lower malfeasance in the
purchase of materials whereas grassroots participation may mostly affect labor theft.
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proposed in the literature Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012); Gneezy, Meier, and Rey-
Biel (2011). Instead, we show that an efficient government institution can crowd out
community incentives to monitor. This latter evidence adds to a smaller but impor-
tant literature documenting how centralized formal institutions can undermine rule
following and pro-social norms Tabellini (2008); Lowes et al. (2017).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2.2 describes the background, experimental
design, and data used. Section 2.3 provides results on corruption and evidence on
the participation effect of the top-down intervention as well as additional results on
substitution across forms of corruption and a policy-related discussion. Section 2.6
concludes the paper.
2.2 Background
This section provides a self-contained summary of the setting, data, and experimental
design but refer to Olken 2007 for a more detailed description.
2.2.1 Setting and Experimental Design
Olken 2007 studies over 600 village infrastructure projects from the Kecamatan Devel-
opment Project between 2003 and 2004 in two of Indonesia’s most populous provinces:
East Java and Central Java. As part of the program, each village proposes the use
of funds for small-scale infrastructure and micro-finance projects. The infrastructure
projects generally involve the construction of roads ranging from 0.5 - 3 kilometers
both within and between villages. Upon receiving funding, the community plans
construction and elects the implementation team in charge of material procurement,
labor hiring, and project completion.
As part of the study, villages were randomly assigned into three possible monitor-
ing interventions: (i) audits conducted by Badan Pengawasan Keuangan dan Pem-
bangunan (BPKP)—a government auditing agency, and two interventions designed to
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increase community participation: (ii) invitations to accountability meetings, and (iii)
invitations plus anonymous comment forms. Invitations allow for more representa-
tive participation while comment forms allow villagers to anonymously voice concerns
with the project’s handling without fear of retribution. The overall distribution of
treatments was: 282 villages (about 47%) were assigned to the audit treatment. Of
those, 189 (about 31%) were also assigned to either the invitations or invitation plus
comment forms treatment.5
We note that all three treatments were assigned independently, so audit and non-
audit villages are equally likely to receive the grassroots treatments. We proceed with
a summary of the interventions.
Audits In the audit treatment, villages learned that the projects would be audited
with probability one by the independent government audit agency. For reference, the
audit probability in control villages was 4%. The villagers were also informed that
the auditors would send the results to the central government and project officials, in
addition to presenting them to the villagers in town meetings. Audits occurred in two
phases: (i) about 1−4 months after the start of construction, and (ii) about 7 months
after construction was complete. After each phase, the audit results were presented
to the villagers in open village meetings. Randomization for the audits treatment was
done at the subdistrict level to avoid audit spillovers into nearby villages within the
subdistrict.
Invitations and Invitations Plus Comment Forms In all villages, three ac-
countability meetings took place after 40, 80, and 100 percent of project funds were
spent. During these meetings village and project heads present an accountability
report and explain how all funds were used. In practice, village heads invite support-
ers and members of the village elite to the meetings. To increase participation, the
5These numbers are presented in Table B9 in the Online Appendix.
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invitations treatment used schools and village heads to distribute either 300 or 500 in-
vitations throughout the village days before each of the three meetings. This equates
to about one in every two households receiving a formal, written invitation. The two
forms of distribution—village head or schools—were used to test elite capture.6 In
the case of the invitations plus comment forms treatment, the invitations included
an anonymous comment form asking for villagers’ opinions on the project. Two days
before each village meeting, enumerators collected the comment forms in a sealed
box. During the meeting, the enumerator read a summary of the comment forms
and a sample of the free-response questions. Randomization for both treatments was
done at the village level.
Olken 2007 concludes that although the audit intervention was quite successful at
reducing missing expenditures, the grassroots interventions were generally ineffective.
However, he shows evidence that this was the result of elite capture via the funneling
of invitations by village heads to individuals that were sympathetic to them in the
community.
We explore an alternative mechanism that can potentially explain the weak ef-
fect of the grassroots interventions. We hypothesize that in villages where an audit
is implemented along with the grassroots interventions, there will be crowding out
of incentives to participate in the monitoring process (i.e., attend meetings, voice
concerns, submit complaints, etc.) as there is an effective alternative. This is par-
ticularly plausible considering that villagers know whether there is also an audit and
results from these audits are shared publicly as part of the accountability meetings.
Conversely, in villages where only the participation interventions were implemented,
we expect to find that grassroots monitoring is more successful in reducing missing
expenditures. Recall that the randomization of the grassroots interventions was in-
6Distribution via schools is less likely to suffer from elite capture as individuals potentially receive
invitations from their children rather than through village heads.
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dependent from the audit randomization. This feature allows us to experimentally
explore how community monitoring incentives and missing expenditures respond to
the grassroots interventions in the presence (and absence) of audits.
2.2.2 Data
We use a combination of the four sources of data collected by Olken 2007: (i) A
village-level survey containing demographic characteristics of the villages as well as
project implementation team characteristics, (ii) a household survey containing basic
household information, such as the number of family members, social, religious, and
government activities, (iii) a meetings survey collecting information on attendance,
participation, as well as a count of the number of issues raised, whether those issues
were related to corruption, and whether participants took serious actions to resolve the
issues,7 (iv) an engineering survey used to create the primary measure of corruption
in the analysis.
For all results in the paper, we combine the two interventions: invitations and
invitations plus comments into a single variable equal to one if a village was assigned
to either of these interventions. Since both variables were randomly assigned indepen-
dently of each other, the combined measure can be thought of as randomly assigned
as well. We use this combined definition since the focus of the paper is in bottom-up
monitoring as a whole and because it allows greater statistical power compared to
separate measures of monitoring.8 “Invitations plus comment forms” refers to the
combined measure hereafter.
7At each meeting, the enumerator kept track of attendees who actively participated in the
discussions with attendees categorized as elites and non-elites. The elite attendees held official
positions in the village (or the project) or were described as informal village leaders by locals. The
non-elite attendees were not serving the village in any of these capacities. Serious actions include
the replacement of suppliers or village officials, reimbursements for missing expenses, and further
internal and external investigations into the issues.
8Results separating invitations and invitations plus comment forms are qualitatively similar and
can be shown upon request.
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In order to assess the validity of the randomization after combining the two
bottom-up monitoring variables, Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for various
village characteristics. We present results separate by whether a village is in the
combined invitations plus comment forms treatment or not. Specifically, column
(1) presents summary statistics for control villages, column (2) for the invitation
and comment forms treatment that was distributed via schools, and column (3) for
the invitation and comment forms treatment that was distributed via neighborhood
heads. Columns (4)-(6) present the results from mean comparison tests across the
three groups. Overall, averages are similar across control and treatment villages sug-
gesting that the sample is well balanced across treatment status. There are some
exceptions, however. There are statistically significant differences in population size,
village head age and salaries between treated and control villages (columns (4)-(6)).
We note that although individual tests may yield statistically significant differences
in some instances, tests for the joint significance of all variables in Table 2.1 fail to
be rejected in all cases.9 Moreover, we replicate all of our main results controlling for
all variables listed in Table 2.1 and they remain robust and quantitatively similar to
the experimental results.10
The measure of corruption used is the percent missing expenditures. This is de-
fined as the difference between the log of reported expenses minus the log of expenses
calculated in the engineering survey. This survey allowed obtaining an independent
measure of actual expenses by estimating quantities of materials used, a worker sur-
vey to measure wages paid, and a supplier survey to measure prices of the materials
Olken (2007).
9P-values reported in the last row of Table 2.1. These p-values come from the joint significance
test of all coefficients obtained from a Probit model using all variables in Table 2.1 as controls to
predict school distribution restricting sample to school distribution and control villages (column (4)),
predict neighborhood head distribution restricting sample to neighborhood head distribution and
control villages (column (5)), and predict school distribution restricting sample to school or head
distribution (column (6)).
10Refer to Tables B10, B11, and B12 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on this measure separately by treatment
type. As in Table 2.1, we further split the invitations and comments treatment by
distribution method (school vs. neighborhood head). A simple analysis of the sum-
mary statistics yields a set of interesting findings that serve as preamble for the main
results of our paper. On average, purely control villages reported missing expenses
of about 30.3 percent. In purely audit villages (i.e., audit present but not grassroots
intervention), percent missing expenses dropped down to about 19.2 percent, suggest-
ing a 11 percentage point drop in missing expenses relative to purely control villages.
Since the focus of our paper is on how the effect of the grassroots interventions var-
ied with the presence of an audit, columns (4) and (5) present mean comparison
tests between missing expenses in grassroots villages and control villages separately
by audit status. First, notice that percent missing expenses were largely unaffected
in villages with distribution via neighborhood heads (column (5)). As Olken 2007
explains, this is likely indication of elite capture rendering the intervention ineffec-
tive. School distribution, on the other hand, minimizes elite capture and thus leads
to a more effective response as shown in Olken 2007. However, column (4) shows a
very interesting pattern once we delve deeper into the effect of the school-distributed
grassroots intervention by audit status. The grassroots intervention when distributed
via schools is quite effective but only when it is implemented by itself (i.e., in the
absence of an audit). Note in the first row of column (4) that the intervention leads
to a statistically significant drop in missing expenses of about 9 percentage points
(0.212 vs 0.303). This is in fact comparable to the drop obtained from the purely
audit strategy (0.192 vs 0.303 in column (1)). However, when an audit is in place, the
effectiveness of the grassroots intervention is quite limited: the difference in missing
expenses between control and school-distributed treatment villages is about 0.9 per-
centage points and statistically insignificant (column (4)). This is also clear by simply
looking at the averages, notice that average missing expenses in audit-only villages
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are around 19.2 percent. Adding the school-distributed grassroots intervention on
top of the audits does not move that average in any meaningful way (20.1 vs 19.2
percent).
We note that this can only be explained by the grassroots interventions responding
to the presence of an audit and not the other way around. Recall that the audits were
performed with 100 percent probability; therefore, the likelihood of being audited did
not change based on the presence of a participation intervention. This also applies
at the intensive margin: the format of the audits used to uncover malfeasance was
standard across all villages, the auditors were external players, and the presence of
accountability meetings was not a factor in how the audits were implemented.11
2.3 Results
This section presents results on the effect of the grassroots interventions on missing
expenditures and on various measures of participation in accountability meetings, by
audit status.
2.3.1 Effect of Bottom-up Monitoring on Missing Expenditures by Audit
Status
We start by exploring how the effect of the grassroots intervention on missing expen-
ditures varies with audit status. Since the issue of elite capture highlighted in Olken
2007 is another potential driver of the grassroots experiment’s null effect, we focus
on villages where the invitations and comment forms were distributed via schools.
Results from invitations distributed via schools are unlikely to suffer from elite cap-
ture as individuals received the invitations directly from their children and hence
bypassing village officials. This ensures that any null effect we find from the com-
11As noted in Olken 2007, audits consisted of “inspections of the project’s financial records and
a field inspection of the construction activities”.
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munity meetings treatment is not due to elite capture affecting the composition of
participants.12 Specifically, we estimate the equation:
Yij = α1 + α2ICij × Schoolij + α3ICij × (1− Schoolij) + δj + εij (2.1)
separately by whether village i had a government audit or not. Yij is the outcome
of interest in village i, in subdistrict j. ICij combines both treatments of bottom-up
monitoring: the invitations and/or the comment forms. Schoolij denotes whether the
invitations were distributed via schools. While δj denotes a subdistrict fixed effect.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level given that the randomization for
the participation interventions was done at this level. Coefficient α2 which gives the
effect of the participation interventions when distributed via schools is our coefficient
of interest.13
For our main results, we present both equation (2.1) separately by audit status
and the fully interacted model that includes the interaction between audit status and
the participation interventions.14 Since we are interested in estimating the effect of
the grassroots interventions, we use subdistrict level fixed effects (strata level) and
clustering of the standard errors at the village level (randomization level). However,
note that since the treatment assignment strata differed between the audit and in-
vitations treatments–randomization of audits was done at the subdistrict level–we
are unable to estimate an audit effect in the fully interacted model since the audit
treatment is constant within subdistricts. With this in mind, we still present results
12Appendix Table A.2 still presents results without differentiating distribution method. The
results are qualitatively similar to the main results presented in this section. However, they are less
precise as expected.
13We estimate this form of equation (2.1) instead of the more conventional Yij = α1 + α2ICij +
α3ICij × Schoolij + δj + εij in order to obtain the effect by school distribution directly from the
coefficient α2 in equation (2.1). Also note that one cannot estimate the interacted model: Yij =
α1 +α2ICij +α3Schoolij +α3ICij ×Schoolij + δj + εij since all school distribution is by default in
the invitations treatment.
14i.e., Yij = α1 + α2ICij × Schoolij + α3ICij × (1− Schoolij) + α5Auditj + α6Auditj × ICij ×
Schoolij + α7Auditj × ICij × (1− Schoolij) + δj + εij
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using different specifications of the fully interacted model which we discuss later in
subsection 2.5.1.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2.3 presents the estimates of α2 from equation (2.1)
using percent missing expenditures in roads as the outcome variable. We focus our
attention on road projects as they account for more than 75% of all project expenses.
However, Appendix Table A.3 replicates these results using missing expenses in roads
and ancillary projects as the outcome variable. Column (1) presents the effect of the
participation interventions on the pooled sample. Columns (2) and (3) present results
separating the analysis by the audit status of the village.
Notice in column (1) that in the pooled sample, the participation interventions
have a relatively small and insignificant effect on missing expenditures. These are
essentially the results shown in Olken 2007. However, once we perform the analysis
separately for audited and non-audited villages, a pattern that is masked in the pooled
sample emerges. Column (2) shows that in the absence of top-down monitoring,
the effect of the community monitoring experiment is considerably larger than when
an audit is present (Columns (3)). Specifically, grassroots interventions lead to a
statistically significant 8.3 percentage point drop in missing expenses when there is
no audit present. In villages where an audit is being simultaneously implemented,
that effect becomes statistically zero (Column (3)).
In order to compare the difference in the grassroots effect between audit (columns
(3)) and non-audit (columns (2)) villages, column (4) of Table 2.3 presents the fully
interacted model that includes the interaction between audit status and the partic-
ipation interventions.15 We focus on the interaction term in column (4). Note that
despite the small sample size and the number of parameters, we still find a statistically
significant difference in the participation effects by audit status.
15Note that we cannot estimate the effect of audits in the absence of the grassroots interventions
(α5) since audits are constant within subdistricts.
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Overall, the results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.3 provide considerable evidence
that the effect of the community interventions in villages where this was the only
monitoring intervention was economically and statistically significant while this same
effect was close to zero in villages where an effective and credible government audit was
in place. These results hold when we use alternative measures of the outcome variable
(Appendix Table A.3) and alternative fixed effects and clustering (Appendix Table
A.1). Similarly, our results hold when using randomization inference to calculate p-
values. These results are presented in Tables A1-A4 in the Online Appendix. Columns
(5) and (6) use different levels of clustering and fixed effects that allow comparing a
purely audit strategy versus a purely grassroots strategy. These results are discussed
in section 2.5.1 below.
We proceed by exploring whether this pattern can be explained by the presence
of audits having a differential effect on participation and engagement in community
monitoring efforts.
2.3.2 Grassroots Participation by Audit Status
The previous section documents a clear drop in the corruption-deterring effect of
the grassroots interventions when there is an audit in place. This section explores
whether this can be explained by audits depressing participation and other measures
of citizen engagement. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:
Ymij = α1 + α2ICij + Ωm + δj + εmij (2.2)
where Ymij is a measure of participation in meeting m, in village i, in subdistrict
j. Ωm is a meeting fixed effect to control for meeting-specific characteristics. The
remaining terms are defined as in equation (2.1). As before, we estimate equation
(2.2) separately by audit status and compare the effect of the grassroots intervention
α2 across these two conditions. We cluster standard errors at the village level given
that the intervention ICij was randomized at this level.
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Note that we do not estimate equation (2.2) separately by distribution method
as we did for equation (2.1). The primary reason is that when one separates by
treatment-distribution bins, some of the participation outcomes vary little within
bins since their frequency is relatively rare. For instance, the pooled sample average
share of corruption-related problems discussed in the meetings, and whether serious
responses were taken in the meetings are 0.06 and 0.026, respectively, for the entire
pooled sample. Therefore, we focus the discussion of our results on the impact of the
invitations and comment forms intervention regardless of how they were distributed.
Nonetheless, Tables A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix present results using distribution
by school. The results are qualitatively similar to the main results presented in this
section although less precise as expected.16
Table 2.4 presents estimates of α2 in equation (2.2) in the pooled sample (columns
(1) and (4)) and separately by audit status (columns (2),(3),(5), and (6)) for two
measures of participation: the number of non-elite who attend the meetings and
the number of non-elite who talk and voice concerns at the meetings. Non-elite are
defined as individuals that have no official position in the village or the projects
Olken (2007). Column (1) shows that the invitations and comments intervention
significantly increased attendance by about 11.8 more individuals. The effect was
about 12.9 more individuals attending in the absence of an audit (column (2)), while
the presence of an audit depressed the effect on attendance by about 19% to 10.5
more individuals. Relative to average attendance, this means that the invitations
and comment forms increased attendance by about 54% in non-audit villages and by
about 43% in audit villages.17
16Similarly, Tables B5 and B7 in the Online Appendix present p-values calculated using random-
ization inference. The results do not vary significantly from the results presented in this section
using conventional inference methods.
17Dependent variable means presented in all tables.
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Looking at more active measures of participation in columns (4)-(6), we find
even more striking differences. In column (5), relative to the average, we document
a statistically significant 39% increase in the number of non-elite who talk at the
meetings (0.344 relative to average of 0.881). Once there is an audit in place, the
effect of the intervention drops by almost 60% and becomes statistically insignificant
(0.344 versus 0.143).
Given spacing constraints, we do not present the fully interacted model as in col-
umn (4) of Table 2.3, however, the row labeled “P-value (No audit=Audit)” provides
the p-value obtained from comparing the grassroots effects across audit and non-audit
villages.18 Note that although we find an economically large difference in attendance
and participation across non-audited and audited villages, the difference is not sig-
nificant at conventional levels. In the case of participation at the intensive margin
(columns (5) and (6)), statistical significance is near conventional thresholds and it
is actually significant using alternative clustering (e.g., districts), and after adding
village-level controls which typically increase precision in an experimental setting.
Overall, it is important to consider that despite the lack of statistical significance in
the difference, we consider the stark contrast between the magnitude and precision
of the estimates in non-audited villages (column (5)) versus audited villages (column
(6)) as valuable evidence of the detrimental effect of audits on participation.
Table 2.5 presents estimates of equation (2.2) using more direct measures of ac-
countability. These measures address issues directly related to the management of
the projects. Specifically, we examine the effect of the participation intervention on
the number of problems voiced, and whether the problems were related to corruption.
We also look at whether village officials are more responsive to the complaints of the
community by looking at whether a serious response was taken to the problems raised
18Specifically, this refers to the p-value on the term α4 in the model Ymij = α1 + α2ICij +
α3Auditj + α4Auditj × ICij + Ωm + δj + εij
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in the meetings. These responses included replacing a supplier or village official, re-
turning funds, internal village investigations, among other things Olken (2007). As in
previous results, we split the analysis by the audit status of the village and focus on
whether the participation effect is affected by the simultaneous presence of an audit.
Column (1) presents the estimated effect for the pooled sample. The invitations
and comments intervention increases the number of problems raised by about 0.088
more issuer per meeting. Columns (2) and (3) show that when the effect of invitations
and comment forms is estimated separately for audited and not audited villages the
effects differ substantially. Invitations and comment forms increased the average
number of problems discussed in a meeting by 0.188—a 16% increase relative to the
baseline average—and this effect is statistically significant at a 5% significance level.
Invitations and comment forms actually have a small and statistically insignificant
effect on the number of problems discussed in a meeting in audit villages (column
(3)).
When looking at corruption problems in particular, the pooled sample estimates
show that invitations plus comment forms significantly increased any corruption re-
lated problems discussed as documented by Olken 2007. When we dissect the analysis
by audit presence in columns (5) and (6) it is clear that the participation effect is
entirely driven by non-audited villages. In particular, in villages without an audit, the
likelihood that individuals voice issues related to corruption in the projects increases
by 2.7 percentage points. This is close to a 36% increase relative to the average pro-
portion in the sample. The findings are not as precise if there is an audit in place
(column (6)).
Regarding any serious response taken during a meeting, we do not find an econom-
ically or statistically significant effect of the participation intervention in the pooled
sample (column (7)). When we split the results for audited and not audited villages,
we uncover that the pooled analysis is masking an interesting pattern. In non-audited
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villages, there is a highly significant response to the participation intervention (column
(8)). The likelihood of a serious response taken increases by 2.1 percentage points
and this effect is statistically significant at a 5% significance level. This represents
more than a 50% increase relative to mean levels. On the other hand, invitations and
comment forms have a null effect on serious responses taken in audited villages and
this effect is not statistically significant.
As in Table 2.4, we present the p-values obtained from comparing the grassroots
effects across audit and non-audit villages. In the case of problems addressed during
the meetings and the likelihood of a serious response taken, we find a statistically
significant difference between the effects in audited and non-audited villages using
conventional levels. In the case of the likelihood of raising corruption-related issues,
we do not find a statistically significant difference. However, it is important to con-
sider that the relative findings in columns (5) and (6) still provide valuable evidence
suggesting that the effect of the participation interventions seem to be more precise
in the absence of an audit.
In summary, this section uncovers two key findings. First, the presence of an audit
seems to inhibit the corruption-deterring effect of grassroots interventions. In villages
with an audit, the invitations and comments intervention leads to a weak response in
missing expenses whereas the intervention is quite effective in non-audited villages.
In fact, non-audited villages with a grassroots intervention in place document a sharp
drop in missing expenses. We then explore what can explain this differential effect.
We uncover a similar differential effect of the invitations and comments intervention
that depends on whether an audit is present in the village. Specifically, we find that in
villages where an audit is in place, individuals are less likely to attend and talk during
the accountability meetings. Compared to their counterparts in non-audited villages,
they are also significantly less motivated to voice general problems, corruption-related
problems, and to push their village to take serious actions to address these problems.
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To put in perspective the differential response, the effect of the participation inter-
ventions in non-audited villages is more than six times larger than in audited villages
for the number of problems raised and almost twice as large for whether any serious
response was taken.
The next section explores, both conceptually and empirically, how the presence of
a credible, external audit can depress participation in the accountability process.
2.4 How can Audits lower Participation?
This section presents a framework to help understand the mechanisms behind the
documented drop in participation in the presence of an audit. We describe the prob-
lem of an individual deciding whether to participate in community monitoring or not.
We assume that the individual is an expected utility maximizer. In the absence of
corruption the individual receives public gain ξ > 0, this can be thought of as the
utility gain from a higher quality road or public good. Participation carries a cost
c > 0 but can bring private utility gain λ ≥ 0 which can be interpreted as “warm
glow” received from engaging in pro-social behavior. In deciding whether to partic-
ipate, the individual assesses that the probability that corruption will be deterred
conditional on his participation p = {0, 1} and audit intensity a ∈ [0, 1] is given by
φa,p. The individual participates if:
φa,1(ξ + λ− c) + (1− φa,1)(λ− c) ≥ φa,0ξ (2.3)
Rearranging, the individual participates if λ + ∆φaξ ≥ c where ∆φa = (φa,1 − φa,0).
Intuitively, the individual participates if private gains from participation and net
public benefits from deterrence are higher than the cost of participation. Assuming
that pro-social norms within the community are distributed with probability function
F (λ), then we can expect the probability of participating for a given individual to
be 1− F (c−∆φaξ). Note that higher costs decrease the probability of participation
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while a higher likelihood of deterrence and higher public benefits from no corruption
make participation more likely. However, a more suitable question for our context is
how does this probability of participation change given an increase in audit intensity?
To simplify the analysis and to follow our setting closely, assume that audit in-
tensity a is either 0 (no audit) or 1 (full audit). Participation will be lower in the
presence of an audit if:19
1− F (c−∆φ1ξ) ≤ 1− F (c−∆φ0ξ) (2.4)
∆φ1 ≤ ∆φ0 (2.5)
where ∆φ1 = φ1,1 − φ1,0 and ∆φ0 = φ0,1 − φ0,0. In words, if the individual believes
that the marginal effect of his participation on stopping corruption in the presence
of an audit (∆φ1) is small, then he will be less likely to participate in the monitoring
process. Intuitively, the individual will be less likely to participate if he perceives his
participation to be trivial or redundant as the outside audit intensifies.20
In a context where the outside audit is credible, effective, and its implementation is
common knowledge among the community; it is plausible that individuals perceived
∆φ1 to be zero (i.e., their “vote” or marginal participation in the presence of an
audit is non-pivotal in deterring corruption). We refer to this as the “non-pivotal
participation” mechanism. In such cases, expression (2.5) holds trivially. This can
explain why we document a drop in attendance and other participation measures when
a government audit is available in the community. Simply put, if people generally
perceive that their marginal contribution is close to zero when there is a credible
monitoring alternative; then they will be less likely to participate in collective action.
19Refer to the Appendix for an extension of the analysis that allows p to be continuous and allows
λ and c to depend on participation p.
20An alternative framing using expression (2.5) is that when deciding to participate, the individual
will ask himself: by how much will the probability of no corruption change by my participation?
With an audit it will change by ∆φ1, without one, it will change by ∆phi0. The individual will not
participate if ∆phi1 is smaller.
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We proceed by discussing alternative explanations. Using our simple model as
reference, participation can also drop in the presence of an audit if either costs c,
public benefits ξ, or the distribution of pro-social norms F (.) vary with audit presence.
If that is the case then differences in participation across audit and non-audit locations
can be explained by these differences and not the non-pivotal participation mechanism
discussed above.
One can think of participation costs as the physical costs of attending the meetings
plus the potential retaliation costs from attending and publicly voicing complaints.
The presence of an audit will not affect physical costs but can affect perceptions
about potential retaliation costs. For instance, the presence of an external third-
party in the form of central government auditors may increase the perception that
individuals are better shielded from retaliation. In such cases, audits will increase the
likelihood of participation. We cannot observe perceived retaliation costs, however,
our results showing that audits depress participation suggest that this mechanism
is either unlikely or that any positive effects in participation resulting from lower
retaliation costs are being overshadowed by the negative effect of the non-pivotal
participation mechanism.
Public benefits ξ should not, in principle, depend on whether there is an audit
or not. Intuitively, the quality of a road built without any malfeasance should be
the same regardless of how this was achieved (audit, citizen participation, honest
officials, etc.). In practice, however, malfeasance may be only partially deterred so
that ξ might depend on how it was deterred. For example, the threat of an audit
might lead to malfeasance in labor costs which may be harder to detect ex-post
(ghost workers, overreporting wages, etc.) but not on material costs. A grassroots
intervention may instead lead to malfeasance in material costs which are harder to
assess by the community but not on labor costs since the laborers are recruited
from within the community and have a stake in whether they are being underpaid.
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Therefore, overall levels of theft and malfeasance may be deterred by the same degree
in both cases but in different ways. The main concern is whether this translates into
different gains in road quality ξ. If ξ differs by audit status then the probability
of participation will be lower in the presence of an audit if ξ1 < ξ0.21 Intuitively,
a lower ξ in audit villages makes fighting against corruption via more participation
less enticing. In principle, this can explain the documented drop in participation in
audit villages. However, note that if the non-pivotal participation mechanism is at
play then whether ξ1 differs from ξ0 is irrelevant in explaining whether audits depress
participation.22
To provide more concrete evidence on this channel, Table 2.6 presents results com-
paring several project characteristics across audit and grassroots monitoring villages
conditional on the level of missing expenditures. The goal is to see whether conditional
on the same level of corruption, road quality (as proxied by several characteristics)
varies between audit and grassroots villages. Evidence of significant differences in
characteristics/quality given the same level of corruption can indicate that public
benefits ξ can depend on the monitoring technology used. In columns (1)-(6), we
focus on the coefficient on the interaction term. We find no evidence that project
size, the share of expenses in sand, rocks, and unskilled labor differs across audit and
non-audit villages with the same level of corruption. There is evidence of a higher
share of gravel used in the presence of audit; however, when looking at all materials
combined (column (5)), the overall difference is close to zero.
We also look at the infrastructure quality score assigned by auditors and engi-
neers within audited villages. These quality scores are an index from a survey where
21From expression (2.5), the probability of participation will be lower in the presence of an audit
if ∆φ1ξ1 ≤ ∆φ0ξ0. Other things equal, if the return on road quality is perceived to be smaller in
the presence of an audit (ξ1 < ξ0) then participation will be lower.
22Note that if ∆φ1 = 0 then ∆φ1ξ1 ≤ ∆φ0ξ0 holds trivially regardless of what ξ0 and ξ1 are.
Intuitively, in making your participation decision, it is trivial whether you can get a different quality
road (differing ξ’s mechanism) if your marginal participation will not change the likelihood that you
get that road (non-pivotal participation mechanism)
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auditors and engineers filled out a long checklist rating the infrastructure quality of
the project as “satisfactory”, “deficient”, and “very deficient”. Higher scores denote
higher construction quality (potentially higher ξ in terms of our model).23 Columns
(7) and (8) compare these scores across monitoring intervention villages conditional
on the same level of corruption.24 We find no evidence that, conditional on the same
level of malfeasance, the quality score assigned to these roads differs in the presence of
a monitoring technology. Overall, the suggestive evidence presented here along with
the likely presence of the non-pivotal participation mechanism suggest that the differ-
ing public benefits (differing ξ’s) mechanism is unlikely to be a key channel explaining
the drop in participation in the presence of audits.
In the case of the distribution of pro-social norms F (.), participation could be
lower in audit villages if norms, i.e., λ’s, tend to be lower in audit villages. This
could happen if the central government selects villages with low pro-social norms to
be audited more often. In such cases, participation on average will be lower in audited
villages due to endogenous selection by the auditing agency. Within the context of
the paper, however, this is trivial as the auditing intervention was randomized.
2.5 Discussion and Additional Results
This section discusses and presents evidence on the relative effectiveness of a purely
top-down versus a purely bottom-up monitoring strategy. It then compares the dis-
tortionary effects of grassroots interventions relative to centralized audits in terms of
the substitution across different types of corrupt behavior that each may cause.
23Refer to Olken 2007 for more details on the quality scores.
24Since these scores are only reported for audited villages, we cannot estimate an “audit” effect.
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2.5.1 Purely Top-down versus Purely Bottom-up Strategy
An important policy question is whether a corruption deterring strategy should fol-
low a purely top-down, or a purely bottom-up strategy, or a combination of both.
Overall, this paper shows that despite policies promoting joint implementation of
both interventions, top-down monitoring seems to depress rather than complement
grassroots efforts. We proceed by presenting evidence on the relative effectiveness
of a purely top-down (audit) strategy versus a purely bottom-up (invitations and
comment forms) strategy.
We proceed by estimating the completely interacted version of equation (2.1)
using alternative clustering and fixed effects that allow estimating an audit effect.25
Specifically, we estimate:
Missing Expendituresijk = α1 + α2Auditjk + α3ICijk × Schoolijk
+ α4ICijk × (1− Schoolijk)
+ α5Auditjk × ICijk × Schoolijk + α6Auditjk × ICijk × (1− Schoolijk) + δk + εijk
(2.6)
where Auditjk equals one if a village in subdistrict j of district k had a government
audit in place. δk denotes the audit stratum fixed effect (i.e., a district fixed effect).
In another specification, we use an engineering team fixed effect. This enables identi-
fication of the coefficient on “Audit”, α2. The other terms are defined as in equation
(2.1). Clustering is done at the subdistrict level given that audit randomization was
done at this level. The purely audit effect is given by α2, while the purely bottom-up
(invitations and comment forms) effect is given by α3.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.3 present the estimates of α2 and α3 from Equa-
tion (2.6). We highlight an interesting result. A purely bottom-up strategy that is
25Recall that equation (2.1) used subdistrict fixed effects and clustering at the village level which
were appropriate to estimate the effect of the participation interventions but not to estimate the
effect of the audit (audit assignment was constant within subdistricts.
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effectively implemented (e.g., elite capture is resolved) is as effective as a government
audit in decreasing the percent of missing expenditures. Specifically, we find that
in audit-only villages, missing expenses decreased by 7.8 percentage points while in
invitations-only villages missing expenses decreased by 7.1 percentage points (column
(5)). As shown in the row labeled “P-value (α2 = α3)” which provides the p-value
for the Wald test comparing coefficients α2 and α3; the difference in the effects is
not statistically significant suggesting that the two effects are statistically identical.
Using engineering team fixed effects (column (6)) yields similar results.26
Given this finding, it is difficult to assess whether a policy of purely top-down or
purely bottom-up monitoring should be followed as the bottom-up approach seems
to yield similar results when properly implemented. From a policy perspective, how-
ever, grassroots interventions can be more cost-effective to implement as top-down
alternatives require the hiring, training, and employment of professional auditors. A
carefully implemented grassroots initiative avoids these costs and potentially enables
a more efficient “unbundling” of monitoring tasks. For instance, trained auditors can
be employed in more specialized auditing tasks since ordinary citizens can monitor
the day-to-day actions of local officials.
Combining the results in this section with the cost-benefit figures in Olken 2007,
we perform a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation on the net benefits of the grass-
roots intervention versus the audit. Since, according to our results in this section,
the school-distributed intervention performs as well as the audit, then the calculation
simply deals with the costs of implementation while leaving all the changes in benefits
from the project and corruption rents unchanged from Olken 2007. Therefore, all of
the accrued benefits of the grassroots intervention come from cost saving. With this
in mind, the grassroots intervention produces a net benefit of about $714 (USD) per
26Results are similar using missing expenses in roads and ancillary projects as the outcome vari-
able. See Appendix Table A.6 for these results.
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village.27 This is almost three times the net benefit of the audit. We also note, that
as discussed in Olken 2007, the monetary benefits of the audit can potentially be
achieved with a lower intensity audit if for instance, a 50% audit intensity (instead
of the experimental 100%) achieves the same level of corruption deterrence. In such
case, the cost of the audit is much lower than the one used here for the comparison.
The differences in net benefits between grassroots and audit will be smaller but un-
likely to change the main takeaway, i.e., that at similar levels of corruption-deterring
performance, a grassroots intervention is much more cost effective than an audit.28
Additionally, exposing communities to grassroots interventions can have positive
externalities. Unlike audits which are context-specific and mostly external to the
communities, exposure to grassroots interventions can help instill pro-social norms
among individuals. This, in turn, can help establish a systematic monitoring presence
in communities as potentially corrupt officials have a constant “threat” of monitoring
by a more engaged community. Less formally, these interventions can help communi-
ties get used to participating in the accountability process. This can potentially have
long-term effects although this is speculative and an interesting area to be further
explored.
2.5.2 Substitution Across Corrupt Offenses
Olken 2007 finds evidence that in audit villages individuals related to village govern-
ment officials or project heads are more likely to be employed in the project. This
provides suggestive evidence that audits may lead officials to substitute from deterred
27We focus our comparison using the numbers for the equal-weighted net benefits in Table 13 in
Olken 2007. We use the time cost of $31 for attending the meetings while monetary costs and the
associated dead-weight loss is assumed to be zero in the case of the grassroots intervention. This
yields a total cost of treatment of $31 which compared to the $468 in corruption rents and $1,213
in project benefits yields the $714 net benefit.
28For instance, again using Olken 2007 figures and assuming a 50% intensity audit carries half
the costs of the 100% audit would yield an estimated net benefit of $480. The net benefits from the
grassroots intervention are still 49 percent higher.
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theft to nepotism. We explore whether the presence of community monitoring also
leads to similar substitution patterns towards nepotism. To do this, we replicate the
results in Olken 2007 for non-audit villages and using the household survey collected
as part of the project.29 We estimate the following equation for non-audit villages:
Workedij = α1+α2ICij+α3Relatedhij+α4IChij×Relatedhij+α5Xhij+δj+εhij (2.7)
whereWorkedhij is whether respondent in household h in village i reports working in
the project for pay. Relatedhij is whether the respondent is related to either a village
government official or a project head. Xhij is a vector of household and individual-
level controls.30 j denotes subdistrict and δj indicates subdistrict fixed effects. We are
interested in coefficient α4 which indicates whether community meetings in non-audit
villages also led to increased nepotism.
Table 2.7 presents the estimated coefficients from Equation (2.7). Column (1)
looks at individuals related to village government officials, column (2) looks at indi-
viduals related to project heads, column (3) combines both. In all cases, the estimates
of α4 are negative and statistically insignificant. This suggests that the presence of
grassroots monitoring in non-audit villages did not lead to higher employment of con-
nected individuals in the projects. In contrast to the results from audits leading to
nepotism, we find no convincing evidence that community monitoring had the same
disruptive effect. We offer two possible explanations: First, the monitoring tech-
nologies are intrinsically different. Audits (top-down monitoring) are centralized and
external to the community. Community monitoring, on the other hand, is “internal”
and participatory in nature. Therefore, forms of malfeasance such as nepotism are
29The household survey was conducted towards the finish of the construction projects. The
household survey was conducted using a stratified random sampling strategy. On average, each
village surveyed contained between 6 and 13 respondents per village. Refer to Olken 2007 for more
information on the design of the survey.
30The controls included are age, sex, and years of education of respondent and number of social
activities and average expenses in the household.
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more easily detected using community monitoring. Simply put, community moni-
tors/citizens “know the ground” better than external auditors. Second, incentives to
deter nepotism are higher for community monitors/citizens than for external auditors
since ordinary citizens can be personally affected by the incidence of nepotism (i.e.,
forgone job opportunity).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes an alternative mechanism to explain why bottom-up monitoring
strategies seem to under-perform relative to top-down strategies. We argue that in
a setting where both bottom-up and top-down strategies are implemented, effective
top-down alternatives can actually lead to a crowding-out of individuals’ participation
in the monitoring process. In other words, the presence of effective and credible
top-down monitoring can actually undermine the participation goals of a competing
grassroots intervention.
Building on Olken 2007 Indonesia corruption experiment, we find considerable
evidence that the participation intervention was successful in villages where this was
the only monitoring intervention. However, in villages where a credible government
audit was being simultaneously implemented, the effect of the grassroots intervention
was close to zero. We provide further evidence that the contrasting effect is the result
of the government audit hindering participation and engagement in the accountability
meetings. After carefully analyzing data on project-related accountability meetings,
we find that in villages where an audit is in place, individuals are less likely to attend
and participate during the accountability meetings. They are also significantly less
motivated to voice general problems, corruption-related problems, and to take serious
actions to address these problems. This offers a stark contrast to non-audited villages
where the voicing of problems, and proactive participation was more significant.
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Encouragingly, we provide evidence that, when properly implemented, a grassroots
intervention can be: (i) as effective as a top-down monitoring strategy in reducing
corruption, (ii) almost three times as cost-effective as a comparable audit, and (iii)
lead to less distortions in the form of dishonest officials substituting across different
types of corrupt behavior.
2.7 Tables
The following section presents the tables from the text. To see additional tables and
extensions of the model presented see the first appendix.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Bottom-Up Monitoring Status
Invitations
+ Comments Differences
Control Schools Heads (2)-(1) (3)-(1) (2)-(3) N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Village population (000s) 4.225 4.810 4.118 0.585 -0.107 0.692 565
(0.206) (0.253) (0.196) (0.221)*** (0.211) (0.257)***
Mosques per 1,000 1.474 1.374 1.449 -0.100 -0.025 -0.074 565
(0.066) (0.077) (0.071) (0.076) (0.081) (0.086)
Total budget (Rp. millions) 81.983 81.285 79.194 -0.698 -2.789 2.091 565
(3.423) (5.577) (3.142) (6.014) (3.472) (5.905)
Number subprojects 2.757 2.702 2.798 -0.055 0.041 -0.096 554
(0.103) (0.108) (0.115) (0.118) (0.111) (0.137)
Percent households poor 0.405 0.408 0.419 0.003 0.014 -0.011 560
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.023)
Distance to subdistrict 5.464 5.321 5.135 -0.143 -0.329 0.186 565
(0.287) (0.381) (0.315) (0.449) (0.391) (0.472)
Village head education 11.503 11.648 11.228 0.146 -0.275 0.421 562
(0.211) (0.201) (0.220) (0.288) (0.268) (0.310)
Village head age 42.848 43.489 44.312 0.641 1.464 -0.823 562
(0.578) (0.621) (0.572) (0.843) (0.828)* (0.854)
Village head salary 2.652 3.580 3.055 0.927 0.403 0.524 559
(0.333) (0.495) (0.394) (0.509)* (0.364) (0.502)
Mountainous dummy 0.361 0.375 0.367 0.014 0.006 0.008 563
P-value (joint significance) 0.468 0.817 0.649
Note—“Invitations + Comments” refers to both “Invitations” and “Invitations and Comment forms” treatments combined. “Schools” and
“Heads” refers to whether the invitations and comment forms treatment was distributed via schools or neighborhood heads, respectively.
Columns (4)-(6) provide the mean comparison tests between the indicated columns. Standard errors clustered at the subdistrict level. *,
**, *** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. “P-value (joint significance)” refers to the p-value from the joint significance
test of all coefficients obtained from a Probit model using all controls to predict school distribution restricting sample to school distribution
and control villages (column (4)), neighborhood head distribution restricting sample to neighborhood head distribution and control villages
(column (5)), and school distribution restricting sample to school or head distribution (column (6)).
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Control Schools Heads (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Control/No audit (N = 253) 0.303 0.212 0.305 -0.090* 0.002
(0.039) (0.051) (0.044) (0.052) (0.042)
Audit (N = 224) 0.192 0.201 0.182 0.009 -0.010
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.056) (0.044)
Observations (N = 477) 162 151 164
Note— “Invitations + Comments” refers to both “Invitations” and “Invitations and
Comment forms” treatments combined. Randomization of audits was independent of
the randomization into invitations or invitations plus comment forms. Refer to section
2.1 in the text or Olken 2007 for more details on the experimental design. “Schools”
and “Heads” refers to whether the invitations and comment forms treatment was
distributed via schools or neighborhood heads, respectively. Standard errors presented
in parenthesis and clustered at the subdistrict level. Columns (4) and (5) provide the
mean comparison tests between the indicated columns.
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Table 2.3: Effect of Grassroots Monitoring on Missing Expenses
Dependent variable: Percent Missing Expenses
All No Audit Audit Full Full Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invitations and Comments -0.029 -0.083** 0.024 -0.083** -0.071* -0.093**
(0.032) (0.039) (0.050) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046)
Audit -0.078 -0.100**
(0.049) (0.050)
Invitations and Comments × Audit 0.107* 0.070 0.084
(0.063) (0.066) (0.069)
Mean 0.252 0.303 0.192 0.252 0.252 0.252
Observations 477 253 224 477 477 477
P-value (α2 = α3) - - - - 0.892 0.911
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Engineer FE No No No No No Yes
Note— Columns (1)-(4) present results from estimating Equation (2.1). Invitations and Comments distri-
bution via schools. Columns (5) and (6) present results from estimating Equation (2.6). “P-value (α2 = α3)”
refers to the p-value from test of equality between coefficients on “Invitations and Comments" and "Audit"
in Equation (2.6) and presented in Columns (5) and (6). Stratum (subdistrict) fixed effects are included
in columns (1)-(4). Stratum (district) fixed effects in column (5). Engineer fixed effects are included in
column (6). Standard errors clustered at the village level in columns (1)-(4) and at the subdistrict level in
columns (5) and (6). *, **, *** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Effect on Attendance and Active Participation by Audit Status
Attendance of Nonelite Number of Nonelite who talk
All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invitations and Comments 11.861*** 12.967*** 10.524*** 0.253*** 0.344*** 0.143
(1.073) (1.591) (1.380) (0.064) (0.091) (0.090)
Mean 24.153 23.860 24.496 0.944 0.881 1.018
Observations 1,775 956 819 1,775 956 819
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value (No audit=Audit) 0.244 0.117
Note— Results come from estimating eq. (2.2) with the participation variables shown in the first row.
“P-value (No audit=Audit)” refers to the p-value on the interaction between audit and the treatment of
comments and invitations. Each observation is a single village meeting. “Nonelite” refers to individuals
that have no official position in the village or the project Olken (2007). Stratum (subdistrict) fixed effects
are included; since audit is constant within a subdistrict, the audit variable is automatically captured by
the stratum fixed effect. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village
level. *, **, *** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Effect on Meetings by Audit Status
Number of Any Corruption Serious
Problems Related Problem Response Taken
All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Invitations and Comments 0.088 0.188** -0.033 0.026** 0.027* 0.026 0.006 0.021** -0.013
(0.058) (0.078) (0.087) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Mean 1.177 1.153 1.205 0.06 0.075 0.054 0.026 0.037 0.012
Observations 1,783 963 820 1,783 963 820 1,783 963 820
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value (No audit=Audit) 0.057 0.945 0.013
Note—Results come from estimating eq. (2.2) with the participation variables shown in the first row. “P-value (No audit=Audit)”
refers to the p-value on the interaction between audit and the treatment of comments and invitations. Each observation represents
one meeting. “Serious response” is defined as “agreeing to replace a supplier or village office, agreeing that money should be
returned, agreeing to an internal village investigation, asking for help from district project officials, or requesting an external
audit” Olken (2007). Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by village. *, **, *** denotes significant
at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Differences in Project Characteristics between Audit and non-Audit villages
Infrastructure
Share of road expenses in: Quality score
Project size All Unskilled
(USD) Sand Rock Gravel Materials labor Auditors Engineers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Invitations and Comments -0.043 -0.009 0.018 -0.015 0.002 -0.002 -0.087 -0.096
(0.061) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.091) (0.091)
Audit -0.101 -0.011 0.022 -0.029* 0.005 -0.005
(0.078) (0.010) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Invitations and Comments × Audit 0.097 -0.000 -0.009 0.062** 0.001 -0.001
(0.086) (0.012) (0.021) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019)
Missing expenditures 0.077 0.007 0.012 0.033 -0.036 0.036 0.048 0.018
(0.078) (0.010) (0.026) (0.060) (0.023) (0.023) (0.151) (0.135)
Mean 8.99 0.10 0.48 0.12 0.80 0.20 -0.02 0.04
Observations 476 477 477 477 477 477 219 212
Note— Columns (1)-(6) include district fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the subdistrict level. Columns (7), (8) include
subdistrict fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. Project size is in logs. Quality score refers to the score given
by auditors and engineers, respectively, on the project infrastructure quality. Auditors and engineers filled out the same checklist rating
the infrastructure quality of the project as satisfactory, deficient, very deficient. Scores are normalized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one. See Olken 2007 for more detail. . *, **, *** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Effect of Grassroots Monitoring on Nepotism
Dependent variable:
Individual Worked in Project
(1) (2) (3)
Invitations and Comments -0.034 -0.044 -0.049
(0.032) (0.029) (0.046)
Village Gov’t Family Member 0.015 0.014
(0.041) (0.041)
Invitations and Comments × Village Gov’t Family Member -0.035 -0.035
(0.050) (0.050)
Project Head Family Member -0.015 -0.027
(0.082) (0.083)
Invitations and Comments × Project Head Family Member -0.031 -0.017
(0.090) (0.091)
Mean 0.300 0.300 0.300
Observations 1789 1789 1789
Note— Results come from estimating Equation (2.7). Results include subdistrict fixed effects. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the village level. All specifications include controls for age, sex, and years of
education of respondent and number of social activities and average expenses in the household. *, **,
*** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Fatal Encounters on Trust in
the Police
3.1 Introduction
In the past few years, fatal encounters between police and civilians have gained in-
creasing media coverage. Although the Black Lives Matter movement began in re-
sponse to the death of Trayvon Martin at the hands of a civilian (Garza 2014), it was
the officer-involved deaths of Eric Garner, Philando Castile, and Michael Brown that
caused the ranks of the movement to swell. The deaths of George Floyd and Breonna
Taylor sparked renewed interest in police violence. Subsequent protests and impas-
sioned responses on both sides only served to further fuel the fires of this controversial
issue.
The specter of discrimination and racism surrounding policing has lead many
academics to study bias in policing. Despite numerous studies, there is little consensus
on the source of biased policing in traffic stops and lower levels of force. Evidence
from Maryland suggests that there is no racial bias in stop and search practices
despite blacks facing a higher likelihood of search (Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001).
However, a similar analysis in Florida is unable to reject that troopers of different races
do not exhibit racially disparate behavior(Anwar and Fang 2006). Fryer Jr (2016)
finds that police officers use non-lethal force against minorities more often, but this
differential use of force toward minorities ceases when force turns deadly (Fryer Jr
2016). In his structural model, police that have a preference for discrimination are
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discouraged from engaging in discrimination due to the high cost of shooting a suspect.
However, a recent comment exposes several data and empirical flaws in Fryer’s work
(Durlauf and Heckman 2020). Goff et al. (2016) conclude that controlling for racial
disparities in arrests, there are still racial disparities in use of lethal force and that
such a disparity may be underestimated (Goff et al. 2016).
While many have sought to assess causes of fatal encounters between officers and
civilians (hereafter fatal encounters), it is also important to the effects of fatal en-
counters as well. For example, Gershenson and Hayes (2018) shows that the death of
an unarmed black teenager in Ferguson, MO lead to a decline in elementary student’s
math and reading achievement. The likely mechanism is absences, as these increase
by 5% in area schools in the wake of the shooting (Gershenson and Hayes 2018).
Similarly, Bor et al. (2018) finds that Black residents report more negative mental
health days up to three months after the police shoot an unarmed Black individual
in their state. Thus, I pose the question: Do fatal encounters affect trust?
In his work on police legitimacy, Tyler states that "When people believe it is
morally just to obey the law [...] a different sort of morality has ‘kicked in’, one that
focuses on the morality of the law in a general ..." (Tyler and Jackson 2014). Tyler
and Jackson (2014) also posits that for an individual’s willingness to accept police
legitimacy rests on their ideology about whether violence as acceptable to attain
control and social change. Much of the police and criminology literature has shown
that this legitimacy is necessary for individuals to cooperate with police in both formal
and informal contexts (Sunshine and Tyler 2003) (Tyler and Fagan 2008). Around
the turn of the 21st century, falling crime rates in major cities like New York and LA
lead to an increase in the trust in the police (Fagan and MacDonald 2012). Despite
this there were still pockets of distrust among some minority individuals, though
surveys suggest this was not the general feeling at the time (Fagan and MacDonald
2012). Fatal encounters may present a shock to trust in police and serve to undermine
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legitimacy. If individuals begin to see police violence as gratuitous or unnecessary
for crime prosecution and prevention, they may cease to trust the police or see them
as legitimate. This paper uses two data sources to address this question. First, I
use national level Gallup surveys of self-reported confidence in institutions in tandem
with fatal encounters data to determine how individuals confidence in the police and
the justice system changes after a fatal encounter. When there is a fatal encounter
of an unarmed individual in a state, there is a 0.25 fall in confidence in the justice
system at the state level.
I pair these results with 911 call volume data from Chicago which I use as a proxy
for trust. Assuming that an individual has no priors about police behavior, a fatal
encounter could provide individuals with new information that lead to updating pre-
vious beliefs. This could lead to a fall in 911 calls if fatal encounters make individuals
more wary of using police services. I find that fatal encounters lead to a fall of 8
calls and officer involved shootings lead to a fall of 13 in the police district where
they occur. This effect increases to 19 calls in cases of shootings of Black individuals.
These results are primarily driven by a large fall in call volume in predominantly
Black police districts.
In further analysis, I look at the effect of the release of dash cam footage depicting
Laquan McDonald’s death. I find the long-term impacts off the release of the dash
cam footage are decreased call volume, an increase in police investigatory stops, and
a fall in CTA traffic. The fall in CTA ridership leads to a fall of about $36 million
annual across the city. To causally link fatal encounters to changes in institutional
trust one has to overcome the endogeneity between fatal encounters and underlying
community characteristics. It is possible that crime rates or inherent distrust can
lead to fatal encounters. The case of Laquan McDonald provides an exogenous shock
to trust because his death occurred nearly 13 months before the release of the dash
cam footage. This means the announcement that shocks trust in the police is un-
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contaminated by McDonald’s death or any circumstances that produced his death. I
also address endogeneity concerns using fixed effects to control for the unobservables
and the violent crime rate to control for the underlying crime characteristics of the
district.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the effects of fatal encounters
and is one of the first to examine the effects of fatal encounters on trust. Most of the
other papers in the literature have sought to assess the causes of fatal encounter or
determine if there is racial bias in police use of force. While (Bor et al. 2018) and
(Gershenson and Hayes 2018) do examine the effects of fatal encounters, they do not
examine trust in the police as an outcome. This is one of the first to examine the
particular impact of fatal encounters on trust. My analysis of the effects of the release
of the Laquan McDonald dash cam footage is also the first to examine this event to
my knowledge.
This paper also contributes to the existing literature on violence and trust. Most
papers in this literature find that the effects of exposure to violence on trust are
lasting. For example, Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt (2013) find that nearly a decade
after the Tajik civil war exposure to this violence leads to a fall in trust within
localities. Similarly, Desmond, Papachristos, and Kirk (2016) find that after the
beating of Frank Jude in Milwaukee there is a net loss of about 22,200 911 calls 1.
The persistent fall in 911 call volume and CTA rides I find after the release of the dash
cam footage seems to mirror the persistent effects in the literature. I the additional
short-term effects on 911 call volume I find for fatal encounters that are less salient
touches a largely unexplored. Most of the papers in the violence and trust look at
very salient events: showing that less salient events can affect trust as well displays
effects the literature may be overlooking.
1Zoorob (2020) shows that the results from Desmond, Papachristos, and Kirk (2016) rely heavily
on an outlier. When removed there seems to be no substantial effect.
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This paper also makes use of a novel data set obtained from the Chicago police
department that has all 911 calls in Chicago between January 2015 and July 2019.
The data is at the day by police district level which allows for spatial and time
variation of the outcome variable. In addition to the overall call volume, I also
have several variables that divide the total volume into different categories of calls.
This allows me to examine which particular call types change in response to a fatal
encounter. Gallup’s confidence in institution survey has yet to be used to gauge
an individual’s confidence in the police and justice system after a fatal encounter.
Because I use the data at the state level, I am able to asses the impact of all fatal
encounters between 2000 − 2016 that occur in a given state within three months of
the survey. The data on confidence in other institutions also allow me to ensure that
the fall in confidence in the justice system is the result of a fall in general confidence
that affects other institutions such as the government, schools, or banks.
The explanatory data, the Fatal Encounters data set 2, is a public data set that
contains all civilian deaths where police are present from 2000 until today. The data
contains a brief description of events surrounding the fatal encounter, coordinates for
the fatal encounter’s location, and demographic information on the victim, including
the victim’s race. I exploit the data’s coordinates for each fatal encounter to map
the fatal encounter to its respective state and Chicago police district. I also use the
victims’ race data to examine differential of race on both survey responses and 911 call
volume. I proceed as follows: section two presents the data, section three introduces
the empirical strategy, section four presents results, and section five concludes.
2I supplement results obtained with this data with Mapping Violence data set for completeness.
These results are found in the appendix.
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3.2 Data
This paper combines data from three separate, unique data sources: (i) Gallup’s
Confidence in Institutions Survey, (ii) the universe of 911 calls and police complaints
from the city of Chicago, (iii) and the US census.
3.2.1 Gallup Confidence in Institutions
My analysis at the national level will use information from Gallup’s Confidence in
Institutions survey. Each year of data contains about 1, 000 observations of individuals
across the country with rich demographic information for each subject. While there
are only 1, 000 observations overall, every state in the US is represented in the data.
Though this data stretches from 2000 to 2016 it does not follow individual persons,
so it is not a true panel. I aggregate responses at the state level because lower levels
of geography have far too few observations to produce a representative sample of the
area. For example, at both the zip code and county level rural areas often have only
one observation per zip code or county. Once aggregated the data becomes a state-
by-year panel from 2000 − 2016. The variables of interest, a respondent’s degree of
confidence in a particular institution, is a variable that takes on a value from 0 − 4
where 4 is the highest level of trust in the institution and 0 is the lowest. 3
I code the confidence variable as 4 for responses of a “a great deal", 3 “quite a
lot", 2“some", 1 “very little", and 0 "None". It is important to note that the response
“None" is voluntary. In other words, surveyors do not offer a response of “None" as
an option in response to the question.
3These values come from the question: “Now I am going to read you a list of institutions in
American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one – a great deal,
quite a lot, some, or very little?
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Figure 3.1: This figure depicts the frequency of survey respondents by race. Whites
make up the overwhelming majority of the data with some black and Asian respon-
dents. The low number of minority respondents allows me to only differentiate re-
sponses for blacks relative to all other races.
Despite the large numbers of Black and Hispanic victims of police fatalities, the
data has mostly white respondents. In fact, white respondents make up the largest
racial group in the data followed by Black respondents. The frequency of Hispanic
and Asian respondents is very low. This does not necessarily pose a problem for the
overall research question; however, the low number of minority respondents could
make it difficult to find any effect for minority confidence in institutions. This also
means that if there is a differential effect by race, it will be more difficult to unearth
with this data.
3.2.2 911 Calls and COPA Complaints
I also use a panel of 911 calls from January 2015 to July 2019 obtained from the
Chicago Police Department (hereafter CPD) through a FOIA request. The data
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from CPD contains the time and date of the call, the police district of origin, 4 and
reason for the 911 call for all calls from January 2015 to July of 2019. From these
records I construct overall call volume and call volume by type of call for each police
district. The final count of police district-by-date observations is just under 30, 000.
The average daily 911 call volume across districts about is about 178 calls. The
Civilian Office of Police Accountability (hereafter COPA) data houses the universe
of complaints against the Chicago Police starting in 2007 at the beat level. Each
complaint has demographic information on the filer (race, age, sex) and detailed time
information on when the complaint occurred. There is also additional information on
the status of the complaint (closed, pending investigation or review, officer suspended,
etc.), the reason for the complaint (bias, excessive force, verbal abuse, etc.), and
the ultimate findings of the investigation (officer exonerated, complaint sustained,
complaint unfounded, etc.). Table 3.1 below presents relevant summary statistics for
the above data.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean SD MIN MAX
(1) (2) (3) (4)
911 Calls 176.28 66.13 0 529
CTA Rides 26215.33 33744.09 15 270148
COPA Complaints .012 .207 0 10
Crime Rate .0355 .0224 .0001 .0856
Fatal Encounters .002 .052 0 3
Officer Involved Shootings .0012 .0345 0 1
Officer Involved Shootings (Black Victim) .001 .0335 0 2
The above table presents unconditional means, standard deviations, mins, and maxes for the key
variables used in the Chicago analysis.
It is important to note that the above data represent daily total for all listed
variables. Though I do use complaints in my main analysis, the paucity of complaints
4CPD divides Chicago into 22 districts which are roughly the size of Chicago’s neighborhoods
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makes estimation difficult. 5 Thus, I use 911 calls as the chief proxy for trust in the
Chicago regressions. Looking at the daily count of fatal encounters by district, the
mean indicates that fatal encounters are fairly rare events. Officer involved shootings
ad shootings of Black victims are even rarer than general fatal encounters. However,
on a few occasions, there are multiple fatal encounters or shootings in the same district
on the same day. Thus, the variable that captures fatal encounters is most often a 0
or 1, it can take values as high as 3 in the data.
3.2.3 911 Calls as a Proxy For Trust
On October 12, 2019 James Smith called the police for a welfare check on his neighbor.
In the course of the welfare check, officers shot and killed his neighbor’s daughter,
Atatiana Jefferson. After the incident Smith told the media he was more reluctant to
call the police now more than ever before. While only anecdotal, this is helps frame
why one can think of 911 calls as a proxy for trust in the police. An individual would
only call the police if they had faith the police to provide aid without unnecessary
escalation. If individuals hold no priors about the police, a fatal encounter can provide
new information that leads to decreased trust in the police. This trust would then
manifest in lower 911 call volume, particularly for calls that an individual might deem
as “voluntary". I formalize this discussion in a model found in the appendix section
entitled “Model of Police Use of Force".
3.2.4 FatalEncounters.org and Supplementary Police Violence Data
The Fatal Encounters data began in response to the absence of a complete national
database on fatal interactions between police and suspects. The data was collected
with the expressed purpose of compiling all fatal encounters with the police since
5The presence of so many zeros necessitates a count model which means I cannot use fixed
effects.
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January 1, 2000. It contains one of the most complete sets of information on police-
related fatalities since 2000. Each record has information on the location of the
fatality, the victim’s demographic information, the police department involved with
the fatality, and the official disposition of the death 6. While most records in the data
are incidences of shootings or vehicular fatalities, accidental deaths and deaths were
the police do not induce the fatality are also included in the data. It is important
to note that the data also contains officer involved deaths: cases where the officer
was present but had no direct role in the subject’s expiration 7. The database’s
curator, D. Brian Burghart, used a mixture of web scraping and crowd funded web
forms to generate the initial database. The data is kept current through scraping and
verifying of sources such as the Gun Violence Archive. Burghart also supplements
these efforts with manual verification. The number of fatal encounters in a district
is between 0 − 3. Most often there are no fatal encounters in a given day in given
district. On a 5 occasions there are multiple fatal encounters in a given day: 2 fatal
encounters in one day on 4 occasions and a single occurrence of 3 in a district in
one day. Given the lack of consensus on even the data surrounding police fatalities
(Fryer Jr 2018), I supplement the fatalencounters.org data with data from Mapping
Police Violence (hereafter MPV). This data set is sourced from FatalEncounters.org,
the US Police Shooting Database, and KilledbyPolice.net. While MPV contains only
incidents where the police are directly responsible for the individuals death, the data
only stretches back to 2015. Thus, it would be impossible to use this data for the
state level analysis with the Gallup data. The Washington Post’s data suffers from
a similar issue which is why I elect not to use it. Additionally, the Washington Post
data only contains shootings, so deaths by use of force other than a shooting would
not appear in the data. I use the MPV data in place of the FatalEncounters.org as a
6This is whether or not the death was ruled a suicide, accidental, justified, or the officer was
indicted
7If the police are present during an overdose for example, this would appear in the data.
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robustness check for the main 911 call results: the findings are qualitatively similar
and presented in the appendix. The subsequent graph shows the number of deaths by
group for all years of the data. Slightly less than half the victims are white, slightly
less than a third are black, slightly less than a fifth are Hispanic, and the rest are
Asian.
Figure 3.2: The above figure shows the frequency of victims in the data by ethnic
and racial frequency. Most victims are white, black, or Hispanic and a very small
portion are Asian. The graph counts Hispanic ethnicity as a race group because
“Hispanic" appears as a race category in the Fatal Encounters data set.
While I will remain agnostic on what leads to the greater prevalence of Black
and Brown victims in the data, this fact does justify a closer examination of minority
responses. It is also important to note that though Hispanic victims form a significant
portion of the data, the paucity of Hispanic respondents in the Gallup survey data
preclude examining a differential Hispanic response in the regression analysis. The
following figure compares the rate of Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American
fatal encounters to that of whites. In other words, I take the rate of fatal encounters
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by population for Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American individuals and divide
it by the rate of fatal encounters by population for white individuals.
Figure 3.3: This figure compares the rate of fatal encounters for minorities to that
of whites. Relative to their white counterparts blacks are almost 4 times as likely to
die at police hands. Black and Native Americans are tied for the highest minority
rate relative to whites.
It is important to note that all minorities are more likely to die at police hands
than whites with the exception of Asian individuals. Most of these deaths are the
result of police action rather than accidents or negligence. The below graph com-
pares induced deaths, where police took direct action to cause a subjects demise, to
incidental deaths, deaths where individuals expired and the police merely happened
to be present.
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Figure 3.4: This figure depicts the proportion of induced fatal encounters over
incidental fatal encounters by race and sex. For Native American males, this metric
is substantially lower than for males of other races.
In the above graph a death counts as induced if an individual’s cause of death is:
Asphyxiated/Restrained, Beaten/Bludgeoned with instrument, Chemical agent/Pepper
spray, Gunshot, or Tasered. All other deaths are considered as incidental. Across
groups there is only minimal variation in the ratio of induced to incidental deaths.
Figure 3.4 presents the spread of fatal encounters across the country at the zip
code level. The darker colored areas indicate a greater number of fatal encounters
while the blank areas are zip codes with no fatal encounters in the data.
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Figure 3.5: This map shows the number of population scaled fatal encounters within
a census tract. The darker colors indicate higher rates of fatal encounters.
The above figure shows a mapping of fatal encounters per capita from 2000−2016
in the US. The darker colors indicate higher rates of fatal encounters per capita. The
spatial distribution is fairly even across the country with the exception of some regions
of the southwest, particularly southern California. The absence of a clear national
pattern mitigates bias concerns. For example, if an area systematically differed from
another in a way that caused more fatal encounter then it is unclear if responses arise
from that difference or the particular incident of police violence. Nevertheless, I still
employ geographic and crime controls in my regressions national specifications.
3.2.5 FBI Uniform Crime Reports on Arrests and Offenses
The FBI Uniform Crime reports for data on violent crimes by state. I use the violent
crime rate at the state level as a control for the level of violence and the crime rate in
a given state. Using this data, I construct the violent crime rates with the population
counts provided in the report for the national level analysis.
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3.3 The Effect of Fatal Encounters on Institutional Trust:
Evidence from a National Survey
To identify the effect of a fatal encounters on confidence in the police force and the
justice system, I estimate the below model. I follow the methodology in Bor et al.
(2018) such that black victims killed within 3 months of the survey count towards
“treatment". I later relax this restriction to include individuals of other races.
Yst = β0 + β1Unarmedst + β2Countst + β3Racest + β4CrimeRatest + εst (3.1)
Where s indexes state and t indexes year. Here Countst is a variable that captures
the count of fatal encounters in the last 3 months, Unarmedst is the count of those
killed that the fatal encounters data describes as unarmed, Racest is a set of vari-
ables capturing the racial/ethnic percentages of individuals by state and year, and
CrimeRatest is the violent crime rate for a state in a given year.
The second specification allows for heterogeneous treatment, by interacting the
percentage of black individuals in a state with the count of unarmed victims. This
again mirrors the methodology in Bor et al. (2018).
Yst = β0 +β1Unarmedst∗Racest+β2Countst+β3Racest+β4CrimeRatest+εst (3.2)
With the exception of this interaction, the model remains constant from 3.1 to
3.2.
In both (3.1) and (3.2) Unarmedst is the variable of interest. Here Yst is a re-
spondent’s confidence in either the police or justice system respectively. The Countst,
Racest, and CrimeRatest variables are controls meant to address differences in polic-
ing across states and a priori differences in confidence based on the states racial make
up. I further control for unobservables at the state level through the use of state and
year fixed effects.
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3.3.1 Results: Gallup Confidence In Institutions Survey
The following table presents results from the estimation of equations 3.1. The first
two columns show the estimation results for confidence in the police while the second
shows the results for confidence in the justice system.
Table 3.2: Confidence in Institutions National Survey
Confidence in Institutions
Police Police Justice System Justice System
Unarmed 0.06 -0.00 0.07 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11)
Count -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
%Black 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
%Hispanic 0.00 -0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Violent Crime No Yes No Yes
Standard errors are robust
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.1 for confidence in police in the first two columns and in the
justice system in the next two. The final row indicates whether or not the specification uses the
violent crime rate.
Here “treatment" is just the number unarmed of Black individuals killed in a given
state within three months of Gallup Confidence in Institutions survey. 8
Estimating the model that interacts the “treatment" with the percentage of mi-
norities in a given state yields the following results.
8I create the unarmed variable by text searching the listed description from FatalEncounters.org.
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Table 3.3: Confidence in Institutions National Survey: Interacted Model
Confidence in Institutions
Police Police Justice System Justice System
Unarmed 0.11 0.07 -0.25∗ -0.25∗
(0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
%AsianXUnarmed 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%BlackXUnarmed -0.01∗ -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
%HispanicXUnarmed 0.01 0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Violent Crime Controls No Yes No Yes
Standard errors are robust
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates 3.1 for confidence in police in the first two columns and in the justice
system in the next two. The final row indicates whether or not the specification uses the violent
crime rate.
Though, confidence in the police is not affected, there is a significant fall in confi-
dence in the justice system at the 10% level. Such a result is unsurprising due to the
strong correlation between the police and justice system. This result holds in both the
presence and absence of violent crime controls. When interacted with the percentage
of Black individuals in a state, the result is small fall in confidence in the police which
is imprecisely estimated. There is significant rise in confidence in the justice system
when interacting the unarmed variable with the percentage of Hispanic individuals in
a state. This rise is not sufficient to offset the overall fall from the unarmed variable,
though. 9
As a robustness check, I now look at effects on confidence in banks and schools in
the following specifications. Thus, I re-estimate equation the interacted model with
self-reported confidence in banks and schools as the outcome variable.
9Given the paucity of Hispanic subjects in Gallup data, the result for Hispanics can be ignored.
The effect size is also less than in any case.
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Table 3.4: Confidence in Institutions National Survey: Other Institutions
Confidence in Institutions
Banks Banks Schools Schools
Unarmed -0.17 -0.22 -0.07 -0.16
(0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17)
%AsianXUnarmed -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
%BlackXUnarmed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
%HispanicXUnarmed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Violent Crime No Yes No Yes
Standard errors are robust
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates 3.1 for confidence in police in the first two columns and in the justice
system in the next two. The final row indicates whether or not the specification uses the violent
crime rate.
Unsurprisingly, there is no effect on confidence in either banks or schools as they
are unrelated to police or the criminal justice system. This seems to indicate that
fatal encounters affect confidence only in the police and the justice system. Other
institutions, governmental or private, seem to remain unaffected by fatal encounters
at the state level.
Results: Social Index Matching
There is evidence that traumatic events that foment institutional distrust primarily
affect individuals that can identify with the victims (Alsan and Wanamaker 2016).
To the extent that fatal encounters represent this type of traumatic event I should be
able to use demographic information in the data to determine which individuals will
present the largest effects to self-reported confidence. I create a social index using
the following equation:
57
SocialIndexit = RaceMatchit + SexMatchit+
ZipCodeMatchit +DateProximityit + Ageit (3.3)
Individuals are given a score of one for each category if they match the victim and
a zero otherwise. In short, individuals that match victims by race, sex, geography,
and time will have higher scores on the index. This framework allows me to as-
sume that all individuals have knowledge of all fatal encounters; however, only those
surveyed within three months of the fatal encounter are counted as “treated" in the
date proximity dimension. I then take this index and regress it against self-reported
confidence in the police.
Policeit = β0 + β1SocialIndexit +Qi + εit (3.4)
Here Policeit is a respondent’s confidence in the police force and Qit are demo-
graphic controls (education, income, race, and sex).
In both of the above equations, i indexes respondent and t indexes an individual
month year within the data. I define date proximity as being surveyed within one
month of a fatal encounter. Thus, a respondent’s social index could change for each
fatal encounter though the demographic information remains the same.
The following graph depicts the coefficient for social index in each of the month-
by-year regressions.
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Figure 3.6: The above figure takes the confidence metric for the police and regress
it against a social index. The results show that an increase in social index decreases
confidence in the police. However, the decrease is slight until around the final two
years of the data. Beginning in about 2014, fatal encounter have a much greater effect
on individual’s confidence.
The graph shows that social proximity to a victim the level of confidence in the
police. However, the magnitude of this effect increases over time. In fact, around 2014
when overall confidence falls, a respondent’s social proximity to the victim becomes
an increasingly powerful predictor of confidence in the police force.
3.4 The Effect of Fatal Encounters on Institutional Trust:
Evidence from Chicago
This paper’s identification rests on the empirical strategy’s ability to capture updating
in an individuals priors about police and police behavior. For example, if an individual
has a prior that the police are trustworthy, a fatal encounter with an officer may
provide new information that causes them to update that prior. To identify an
effect, my empirical strategy must show evidence that such updating is occurring. In
59
other words, fatal encounters with police must present new information that causes
individuals to update their priors.
3.4.1 911 Call Volume and Police Complaints
Using evidence from Chicago, I estimate the following model to determine the effect
of fatal encounters on confidence in the police force.
CallV olumedt = β0 + +β1FatalEncounterdt + β3Racedt + β4CrimeRated + δdt + εdt
(3.5)
The panel is at the district-by-day level. In other words, d indexes police district
and t indexes the day. Thus, FatalEncounterdt is a variable that captures the number
of fatal encounters in a given district in a given day, the Racedt variable is represents
the percent of a particular race in a given district, CrimeRatedt is the violent crime
rate in a given district in a given year, and δdt is a vector of district fixed effects.
When collapsed by police district, 911 call volume becomes a count variable. Having
substantial mass on zero would require the use of a count model to attain unbiased
estimates. Below I provide a kernel density plot
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Figure 3.7: This graph gives the kernel density estimates for the daily 911 call
volume by police district.
Here the probability mass at zero is not a substantial one; thus, I elect to use a
linear panel specification. 10 The panel model allows for the use of fixed effects which
cannot be used with non-linear models due to the incidental parameters problem. I
estimate equation (3.7) both with linear panel and count models. The tables in the
results section display the linear panel model 11.
3.4.2 Potential Threats to Validity
The chief concern with identifying an effect with the given empirical strategy and data
is the endogeneity between fatal encounters and confidence in the police force. My
analysis implicitly assumes that fatal encounters engender distrust which I measure
through 911 call volume, police complaints, and self-reported confidence metrics. It
is possible that a lack of confidence in the police could increase the number of fatal
10Count models of the main specification are provided in the appendix as a robustness check
11The main results are replicated using a count model in the appendix in table B.3
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encounters rather than fatal encounters affecting confidence. To the extent that the
violent crime rate is a function of past confidence, the violent crime controls will
correct this issue. However, if confidence and the crime rate is a function of the
interactions with law enforcement, then the violent crime rate will be limited in its
ability to correct for such endogeneity. In the appendix I am able to show that
using Investigatory Stops as a control does not qualitatively change the main result.
When used as an outcome, Investigatory Stops do not change in response to a fatal
encounter. A final caveat is the data itself. While the Fatal Encounter Data is the
best data to capture fatal encounters with police, it is still potentially flawed. It is
possible that changes in confidence in police or the cultural milieu beginning around
the time of Trayvon Martin’s death caused changes in reporting. For example, it is
possible that as fatal encounters became more salient, the data became more complete.
Although I can rule out that this is a systematic problem at the state level12, I cannot
rule out that confidence created absences in the data at lower levels of reporting. I
also address this concern by replicating the main result with Mapping Violence data
set.
3.4.3 Results: Gallup Confidence In Institutions Survey
The following table presents results from the estimation of equations 3.1. The first
two columns show the estimation results for confidence in the police while the second
shows the results for confidence in the justice system.
12There is no state systematically missing from the Fatal Encounters Data for any given year
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Table 3.5: Confidence in Institutions National Survey
Confidence in Institutions
Police Police Justice System Justice System
Unarmed 0.06 -0.00 0.07 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11)
Count -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
%Black 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
%Hispanic 0.00 -0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Violent Crime No Yes No Yes
Standard errors are robust
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates 3.1 for confidence in police in the first two columns and in the justice
system in the next two. The final row indicates whether or not the specification uses the violent
crime rate.
Here “treatment" is just the number unarmed of Black individuals killed in a given
state within three months of Gallup Confidence in Institutions survey. 13
Estimating the model that interacts the “treatment" with the percentage of mi-
norities in a given state yields the following results.
13I create the unarmed variable by text searching the listed description from FatalEncounters.org.
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Table 3.6: Confidence in Institutions National Survey: Interacted Model
Confidence in Institutions
Police Police Justice System Justice System
Unarmed 0.11 0.07 -0.25∗ -0.25∗
(0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14)
%AsianXUnarmed 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
%BlackXUnarmed -0.01∗ -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
%HispanicXUnarmed 0.01 0.00 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Violent Crime Controls No Yes No Yes
Standard errors are robust
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates 3.1 for confidence in police in the first two columns and in the justice
system in the next two. The final row indicates whether or not the specification uses the violent
crime rate.
Though, confidence in the police is not affected, there is a significant fall in confi-
dence in the justice system at the 10% level. Such a result is unsurprising due to the
strong correlation between the police and justice system. This result holds in both the
presence and absence of violent crime controls. When interacted with the percentage
of Black individuals in a state, the result is small fall in confidence in the police which
is imprecisely estimated. There is significant rise in confidence in the justice system
when interacting the unarmed variable with the percentage of Hispanic individuals in
a state. This rise is not sufficient to offset the overall fall from the unarmed variable,
though. 14 As a robustness check, I now look at effects on confidence in banks and
schools in the following specifications. Thus, I re-estimate equation the interacted
model with self-reported confidence in banks and schools as the outcome variable.
14Given the paucity of Hispanic subjects in Gallup data, the result for Hispanics can be ignored.
The effect size is also less than in any case.
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Table 3.7: Confidence in Institutions National Survey: Other Institutions
Confidence in Institutions
Banks Banks Schools Schools
Unarmed -0.17 -0.22 -0.07 -0.16
(0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17)
%AsianXUnarmed -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
%BlackXUnarmed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
%HispanicXUnarmed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Violent Crime No Yes No Yes
Standard errors are robust
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates 3.1 for confidence in police in the first two columns and in the justice
system in the next two. The final row indicates whether or not the specification uses the violent
crime rate.
Unsurprisingly, there is no effect on confidence in either banks or schools as they
are unrelated to police or the criminal justice system. This seems to indicate that
fatal encounters affect confidence only in the police and the justice system. Other
institutions, governmental or private, seem to remain unaffected by fatal encounters
at the state level.
Results: Social Index Matching
There is evidence that traumatic events that foment institutional distrust primarily
affect individuals that can identify with the victims (Alsan and Wanamaker 2016).
To the extent that fatal encounters represent this type of traumatic event I should be
able to use demographic information in the data to determine which individuals will
present the largest effects to self-reported confidence. I create a social index using
the following equation:
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SocialIndexit = RaceMatchit + SexMatchit +
ZipCodeMatchit +DateProximityit + Ageit
Individuals are given a score of one for each category if they match the victim and
a zero otherwise. In short, individuals that match victims by race, sex, geography,
and time will have higher scores on the index. This framework allows me to as-
sume that all individuals have knowledge of all fatal encounters; however, only those
surveyed within three months of the fatal encounter are counted as “treated" in the
date proximity dimension. I then take this index and regress it against self-reported
confidence in the police.
Policeit = β0 + β1SocialIndexit +Qi + εit (3.6)
Here Policeit is a respondent’s confidence in the police force and Qit are demo-
graphic controls (education, income, race, and sex).
In both of the above equations, i indexes respondent and t indexes an individual
month year within the data. I define date proximity as being surveyed within one
month of a fatal encounter. Thus, a respondent’s social index could change for each
fatal encounter though the demographic information remains the same.
The following graph depicts the coefficient for social index in each of the month-
by-year regressions.
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Figure 3.8: The above figure takes the confidence metric for the police and regress
it against a social index. The results show that an increase in social index decreases
confidence in the police. However, the decrease is slight until around the final two
years of the data. Beginning in about 2014, fatal encounter have a much greater effect
on individual’s confidence.
The graph shows that social proximity to a victim the level of confidence in the
police. However, the magnitude of this effect increases over time. In fact, around 2014
when overall confidence falls, a respondent’s social proximity to the victim becomes
an increasingly powerful predictor of confidence in the police force.
3.5 The Effect of Fatal Encounters on Institutional Trust:
Evidence from Chicago
This paper’s identification rests on the empirical strategy’s ability to capture updating
in an individuals priors about police and police behavior. For example, if an individual
has a prior that the police are trustworthy, a fatal encounter with an officer may
provide new information that causes them to update that prior. To identify an
effect, my empirical strategy must show evidence that such updating is occurring. In
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other words, fatal encounters with police must present new information that causes
individuals to update their priors.
3.5.1 911 Call Volume and Police Complaints
Using evidence from Chicago, I estimate the following model to determine the effect
of fatal encounters on confidence in the police force.
CallV olumedt = β0 + +β1FatalEncounterdt + β3Racedt + β4CrimeRated + δdt + εdt
(3.7)
The panel is at the district-by-day level. In other words, d indexes police district
and t indexes the day. Thus, FatalEncounterdt is a variable that captures the number
of fatal encounters in a given district in a given day, the Racedt variable is represents
the percent of a particular race in a given district, CrimeRatedt is the violent crime
rate in a given district in a given year, and δdt is a vector of district fixed effects.
When collapsed by police district, 911 call volume becomes a count variable.
Having substantial mass on zero would require the use of a count model to attain
unbiased estimates. Below I provide a kernel density plot
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Figure 3.9: This graph gives the kernel density estimates for the daily 911 call
volume by police district.
Here the probability mass at zero is not a substantial one; thus, I elect to use a
linear panel specification. 15 The panel model allows for the use of fixed effects which
cannot be used with non-linear models due to the incidental parameters problem.
I estimate equation (3.7) both with linear panel and count models. The tables in
the results section display the linear panel model 16.
3.5.2 Potential Threats to Validity
The chief concern with identifying an effect with the given empirical strategy and data
is the endogeneity between fatal encounters and confidence in the police force. My
analysis implicitly assumes that fatal encounters engender distrust which I measure
through 911 call volume, police complaints, and self-reported confidence metrics. It
is possible that a lack of confidence in the police could increase the number of fatal
15Count models of the main specification are provided in the appendix as a robustness check
16The main results are replicated using a count model in the appendix in table B.3
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encounters rather than fatal encounters affecting confidence. To the extent that the
violent crime rate is a function of past confidence, the violent crime controls will
correct this issue. However, if confidence and the crime rate is a function of the
interactions with law enforcement, then the violent crime rate will be limited in its
ability to correct for such endogeneity. In table [] in the appendix I am able to show
that using Investigatory Stops as a control does not qualitatively change the main
result. When used as an outcome, Investigatory Stops do not change in response to
a fatal encounter.
A final caveat is the data itself. While the Fatal Encounter Data is the best data
to capture fatal encounters with police, it is still potentially flawed. It is possible that
changes in confidence in police or the cultural milieu beginning around the time of
Trayvon Martin’s death caused changes in reporting. For example, it is possible that
as fatal encounters became more salient, the data became more complete. Although
I can rule out that this is a systematic problem at the state level17, I cannot rule
out that confidence created absences in the data at lower levels of reporting. I also
address this concern by replicating the main result with Mapping Violence data set.
3.5.3 Results: Evidence from Chicago
The subsequent table estimates equation 3.7 without police district level race controls
in panel A. Panel B estimates equation 3.7 incorporating police district level race
controls, and Panel C interacts the indicator for a black police district with the fatal
encounter variable.
17There is no state systematically missing from the Fatal Encounters Data for any given year
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Table 3.8: Daily 911 Call Volume by Police District
911 Calls (by Police District)
(1) (2) (3)





Shooting (Black Victim) -17.93∗∗∗
(4.80)





Shooting (Black Victim) -19.07∗∗∗
(5.21)
Panel C: District Level Race Interactions








Black Police District 6.67∗∗∗ 7.91∗∗∗
(2.19) (2.64)
Black Dist. X Shooting (Black Victim) -37.48∗∗∗
(13.78)
Shooting (Black Victim) 11.94
(12.53)
Average Call Volume 178.51 178.51 178.51
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.7 in panels A and B. Panel B also includes district level race
controls. Panel C estimates interacts the Fatal Encounter variable with a dummy variable for a
predominantly Black police district.
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A fatal encounter in a police district leads to a significant decrease in overall call
volume. This effect is larger for officer involved shootings and even larger if the victim
is black. If I estimate the same equation with district level race controls, the results
are qualitatively the same, though the magnitudes are increased. This fall in call
volume represents between a 7.5% and 10% reduction in call volume overall.
When I interact the Black district indicator, a dummy for a police district with
a population that is 60%+ Black, the fatal encounters no longer have a significant
effect on 911 call volume. For shootings in general and shootings of black individuals,
the interaction term is significant, though the dummy variable for a shooting is not.
This suggests that the significant fall in 911 call volume observed in Panel A is mostly
driven by a differential Black response to these incidents. The differential effect is
also larger for shootings of Black victims when compared to shootings in general.
The effect size here also increases to a nearly 20% fall in call volume on the day of a
shooting.
Event Study
Having found that 911 call volume falls on the day a fatal encounter occurs, I now
perform an event study to find out how long this event persists. The following graphic
tracts the coefficient on the number of fatal encounters 3 days before and after a fatal
encounter occurs.
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Figure 3.10: An event study tracking the change in call volume when a fatal
encounter occurs.
It is immediately clear there is no evidence of significantly differential pre-trends
in call volume prior to a fatal encounter. Surprisingly, the effect on call volume is
also short-lived. The count of fatal encounters has no statistically significant effect
on 911 call volume in the days after a fatal encounter occurs. While the effect on call
volume is large on the day of a fatal encounter, it is short-lived.
Robustness Checks
To ensure that the effect on call volume I find is truly due to the count of fatal
encounters, I estimate the same statistical model using calls termed as a misdials
as the outcome. One can safely assume that misdialing 911 is a random event and
should in no way be affected by the count of fatal encounters in a given police district.
I present the results for these estimations in Panels A and B of the following table.
Panel C presents EMS calls. These should also remain unaffected by a fatal encounter
as the institutions of the police and emergency medicine are separate.
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Table 3.9: Daily Misdial and EMS Call Volume by Police District
911 Misdials and EMS Calls (by Police District)
(1) (2) (3)





Shooting (Black Victim) -0.00
(0.01)





Shooting (Black Victim) -0.00
(0.01)





Shooting (Black Victim) -0.11
(0.41)
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.7 for specific call types. 911 misdials are the outcome in panels
A and B. Estimation in panel B uses district level race controls. Panel C estimates equation 3.7
with EMS calls as the outcome with district level race controls. Column (1) presents the estimates
for fatal encounters, column (2) presents the estimates for only shootings, and column (3) presents
the estimates for shootings of Black individuals. All estimations use district-level fixed effects
Here we see that both in magnitude and significance, the coefficients indicate that
fatal encounters have no impact on the volume 911 calls that are misdials or for the
EMS. This then begs the question of exactly which types of 911 calls are affected by
fatal encounters? An individual may call 911 if the individual believes the police can
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provide assistance without escalating the situation. In extreme cases, individuals may
not even choose to call the police for very serious offenses if they fear the personal or
general reprecussions (Gansberg 0037). I present a model that captures an individuals
police usage in the appendix. If the perceived benefits calling 911 do not outweigh
the perceived risks to the individual and others, then the individual will not call 911.
It is possible for lower level offenses, such as selling drugs that an individual may
not call 911 if a fatal encounter raises the perceived cost of calling the police. To
empirically test this conjecture, I re-estimate equation 3.7 with only 911 calls for the
selling of narcotics.
Table 3.10: Daily Narcotics Call Volume by Police District






Shooting (Black Victim) -1.49∗∗
(0.58)
Average Call Volume 4.54 4.54 4.54
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.7 for only calls for individuals selling narcotics. Column (1)
presents the estimates for fatal encounters, column (2) presents the estimates for only shootings, and
column (3) presents the estimates for shootings of black individuals. All estimations use district-level
fixed effects
While there is no effect for a fatal encounter, shootings and shootings of Black
individuals lead to a about 1.5 less drug calls on the day they occur. This represents
a fall of between 30% and 32% which is larger in percentage terms than the fall in
overall call volume after a fatal encounter or shooting 18
18I forgo further analysis of the drug calls due to the low number of non-zero observations in the
outcome variable when adding interaction terms.
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It is possible that the fall in call volume that follows fatal encounters is the result
of less overall activity during the day of the fatal encounter. Individuals that learn
about a fatal encounter may choose to suspend their normal activities at least for
that day. This would manifest in lower CTA rides in a district on the day of a fatal
encounter as individuals decrease their activity. Such a fall in daily activity could be
what is driving the fall in 911 calls rather than falling trust. If individuals are less
active after a fatal encounter, they may have less reason to call the police because
there is simply less interaction between individuals and criminals.
To determine if this is an issue, I re-estimate equation 3.7 with the outcome as
subway rides. Below I present a map of the locations of the CTA stations overlaid
on the police districts. While there are no railway stations in the 22nd, 4th, 25th, and
31st, there is at least one station every other district. Figure 3.11 overlays the police
district with the with the location of the fatal encounters and CTA stations. CTA
stations are the pink dots and the red dots are the locations of fatal encounters.
Figure 3.11: This figure overlays the location of fatal encounters and CTA sta-
tions on police districts. The red dots represent fatal encounters while the pink dots
represent CTA stations.
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From figure 3.11 It quickly becomes clear that the majority of fatal encounters
come in areas with CTA station coverage. Thus, if fatal encounters truly do affect
general activity through CTA ridership, then I should pick up a significant portion
of this effect.
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Table 3.11: Daily CTA Ridership by Police District
Number of CTA Rides by Police District





Shooting (Black Victim) 901.85
(2443.15)





Shooting (Black Victim) 1352.06
(2585.61)
Panel C: District Level Race Interactions




Black Police District -21268.55 -21258.23
(16215.69) (16734.98)




Black Dist. X Shooting (Black Victim) -4462.90
(5709.90)
Shooting (Black Victim) 4448.04
(4972.15)
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.7 with CTA rides as the outcome
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Here it becomes clear that there is no statistically significant change in the amount
of CTA rides after a fatal encounter or shooting. This holds regardless of the controls
or interactions I use in the estimation. Thus, fatal encounters have no effect on
general activity in the districts where they occur.
3.5.4 Police Complaints
If 911 calls represent one’s willingness to trust and engage with the police, then
complaints represent one’s dissatisfaction with the way the police perform their jobs.
In other words, individuals will only issue a complaint against the police if they
believe the police have failed in their duty to protect and serve. While this is not
a perfect measure of either trust or confidence, if there are more complaints after a
fatal encounter, then this is additional evidence that individuals are displeased with
the police behavior they observe.
Thus, to supplement the above regressions, I explore the effect of fatal encounters
on police complaints. The analysis examines both the effect on the overall number of
complaints and the composition of complaints. In these specifications, “treated" beats
are those where there was a fatal encounter on a given day. However, when there are
no fatal encounters in a given beat in a given month then there are no complaints. In
short, the correlation between fatal encounters and police complaints is perfect: fatal
encounters perfectly predict the issuance of complaints at the beat level.
I attempt to overcome this issue by aggregating complaints to the police district
level. I then re-estimate equation 3.7 with a panel negative binomial regression. The
results from this estimation are in the table below.
Here we see that in nearly all cases fatal encounters increase the number of com-
plaints. This result is almost always statistically significant as well. Here the effect
has the greatest magnitude for shootings with a lesser magnitude for Shootings of
Black individuals. The smallest magnitude comes from general fatal encounters. In
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Table 3.12: Daily Police Complaints by Police District
COPA Complaints (by Police District)
(1) (2) (3)














Panel C: District Level Race Interactions




Black Police District 1.01 -1.96 1.53∗
(0.74) (.) (0.79)




Black Dist. X Shooting (Black Victim) -2.90∗∗∗
(0.77)
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.7 with COPA complaints as the outcome. Panel A is with only
crime controls, Panel B adds district level race controls, and Panel C interacts the fatal encounter
variable with the indicator for a predominantly Black police district.
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the interacted model, when a Black individual is shot in a predominantly Black police
district there is actually a fall in the number of complaints. It is possible to explain
this as a severe lack of trust. In tandem with the fall in 911 calls this could be
evidence that individuals have reached the zero lower bound for trust in the police.
An individual who believes the police cannot be trusted and that the police will not
change their behavior, will not call 911 or issue complaints against the police.
Announcement vs Event: The Case of Laquan McDonald
On October 24, 2014, 17-year-old Laquan McDonald was killed by police in Chicago.
However, it was not until November 24, 2015 that the dash cam footage that showed
McDonald walking away while shot was release. The release of the dash cam footage
sparked a series of protests and led to the indictment of officer Van Dyke. The gap
between McDonald’s death and the announcement allows me to see if the announce-
ment of a fatal encounter can foment distrust in the police and see if the distrust is
lasting for an incident of that is very salient. I do not examine the effect of the actual
incident because my data begins in January of 2015, several months after Laquan
McDonald’s death.
Analyzing the effects of the dash cam footage release will provide another means
of overcoming any potential reverse causality. It is unlikely that 911 call volume, or
lack thereof, causes fatal encounters given the results of earlier robustness checks.
Nevertheless, the subsequent analysis is free from reverse causality concerns. It is
difficult to imagine how 911 call volume could affect the release date even if it somehow
did affect the likelihood of a fatal encounter between McDonald and the police. This
case also allows to examine whether more salient events create stronger or possible
longer lasting effects on trust.
To test both the depth and length of this effect, I employ the following statistical
model.
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Table 3.13: Laquan McDonald Effect (Short-term)
Laquan McDonald Announcement (Short-Term Effects)
Stops 911 Calls CTA Rides Complaints
Panel A: Basic Model
McDonald 0.06 -2.66 7457.57∗∗ -14.75
(5.85) (2.72) (3047.49) (8205.33)
Panel B: Interacted Model
McDonaldXBlack -5.57 -7.28 -6082.11 -3.00
(12.05) (6.04) (6573.14) (19198.80)
McDonald 1.31 -2.32 9915.32∗∗∗ -12.52
(7.11) (3.56) (3798.03) (14743.77)
Average Daily Volume 14.33 180.90 26474.75 0.00
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.8 with various outcomes. Panel A is estimates the basic
immediate effect of the release of the dash cam footage depicting Laquan McDonald’s death. The
McDonald variable switches on and immediately turns off. Panel B interacts theMcDonald variable
with an indicator for predominantly Black police districts. All columns are estimated using district
fixed effects except the police complaint column which uses a negative binomial specification.
Y = β0 + β1McDonaldd + β3Racedt + β4CrimeRated + δdt + εdt (3.8)
In the first round I estimate the above equation with the McDonaldd variable is
an indicator for the date the dash cam footage was released and the following days
of protests that switches off immediately afterwards. Here the Racedt, CrimeRated
and δdt are the same variables as the variables in equation 3.7. The outcomes of
interest here are 911 call volume, Investigatory Stops by the police, the number of
CTA rides, and the volume complaints against officers. The following table presents
the estimates for equation 3.8.
Here we see there are few short-term effects. The only statistically significant effect
is the increase in CTA rides after the release of the dash cam footage. It is important
to note that average complaint volume is not actually zero, though complaints are
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Table 3.14: Laquan McDonald Effect (Long-term)
Laquan McDonald Announcement (Long-Term Effects)
Stops 911 Calls CTA Rides Complaints
Panel A: Basic Model
McDonald 7.53∗∗∗ -1.65∗∗∗ -2109.28∗∗∗ -0.37
(0.29) (0.59) (312.69) (0.49)
Panel B: Interacted Model
McDonaldXBlack 11.83∗∗∗ -0.50 2447.49∗∗∗ -19.19∗
(0.54) (1.21) (621.29) (11.06)
McDonald 5.66∗∗∗ -0.81 -2913.78∗∗∗ 18.34∗
(0.39) (0.86) (430.40) (10.98)
Average Daily Volume 14.33 180.90 26474.75 0.00
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table estimates equation 3.8 with various outcomes. Panel A is estimates the basic
effect of the release of the dash cam footage depicting Laquan McDonald’s death. The McDonald
variable switches on and remains on. Panel B interacts theMcDonald variable with an indicator for
predominantly Black police districts. All columns are estimated using district fixed effects except
the police complaint column which uses a negative binomial specification.
very infrequent. To correct for this, I estimate the complaints regression using a
negative binomial specification 19.
I now re-estimate equation 3.8 using the McDonaldd variable as a post indicator.
In other words, the variable has a value of zero before the release of the dash cam
footage and 1 afterwards. Here the indicator also does not turn off. I present the
estimates for this specification below.
Here we see that the effects are mostly long-term. Police investigatory stops
increased after the release of the dash cam footage. This increase was over 50% in
predominately Black police districts. There is also an overall decrease in call volume
of about two calls or about 1%. However, this effect fades in the interacted model.
While there is also a statistically significant increase in the number of CTA rides
19I omit fixed effects in these estimates to avoid the incidental parameters problem.
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after the release of the dash cam footage in predominantly Black police districts, the
overall effect is a fall in the number of CTA rides. There also seems to be suggestive
evidence that the number of complaints rose after the release of the dash cam footage.
However, in predominately Black police districts the number of complaints actually
fell. This could be indicative that such districts are approaching the zero lower
bound for trust in the police 20. The results for police complaints should be taken
with caution because they are only significant at the 10% level.
3.6 Conclusion
I find that after a fatal encounter call volume decreases by about 11 calls on average in
a police district which is a about a 6% in daily 911 call volume. This fall becomes as
large a 30% for the shooting of Black victims in predominately Black police districts.
The mechanism seems to be “voluntary" calls: in particular, calls for the selling of
narcotics fall after a fatal encounter.
I also find that fatal encounters have a small overall effect on confidence in the
justice s at the state level. After the police related death of an unarmed Black
individual, state confidence in the justice system falls slightly. This is particular to
the justice system which indicates that confidence in the police may be more immobile.
The matching results also show us that “social distance" has a negative and sig-
nificant effect on a respondents confidence in the police force. This effect grows
increasingly stronger overtime and is particularly strong in recent years.
Looking specifically at the case of Laquan McDonald, I find that the release of the
dash cam footage had few short-term effects, but presented several long term effects.
I find that call volume fell about 1% and investigatory stops increased about 39%
overall and 50% in predominantly Black police district. CTA ridership fell about 7%
20Individuals will not issue complaints against the police if they believe such complaints will
remain unaddressed. An individual who believes that police behavior is problematic, yet immutable,
similarly will not issue complaints against the police
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per day in a given police district. A back of the envelope calculation shows that this
fall leads to about a $36 million revenue loss across all districts in Chicago.
In summation, the effects of police violence are far from negligible. The revenue
loss associated with the fall in trust from the release of the dash cam footage de-
picting Laquan McDonald’s death is substantial. This is to say nothing of potential
implications on crime rates, crime detection, and arrest rates. While this is only
one particular case, if salient fatal encounters lead to this type of effect, this merely
highlights the depth of the issue we face. The need to better understand why fatal
encounters happen, what can be done to prevent them, what reforms need to be




Despite the evidence presented in this last chapter, there are some limitations with
the project. One must acknowledge that the fall in 911 calls after a fatal encounter
could be a mechanical response rather than a result of falling trust. If would be
criminals either spatially or temporally change their decisions to commit crimes due
to a fatal encounter’s propensity to increase police presence, then 911 calls would also
fall because there is less crime in the area. To address this concern, future work will
have to explore spatial and temporal crime displacement as an outcome to ensure that
changing criminal behavior is not driving the fall in 911 calls. As an additional test,
one should also examine the effects of shootings unrelated to police or other events
that would lead to increased police presence on 911 calls. If there are no statistically
significant effects from this examination, then one can more credibly conclude that
the fall in 911 calls are the result of falling trust.
The methodology and topics from both chapters opens several avenues for future
research. The second chapter begs the question of whether interpersonal trust is also
affected by exposure to police violence. To test this the effect of police violence on
interpersonal trust, one could use the classic trust game create by Berg, Dickhaut,
and McCabe (1995) to test trust and trust worthiness. The design would hinge on
several different treatments that vary the type of exposure to police violence. In
the baseline, player one will be given $10 which they can keep or send some or all
of to player two. Any money sent to player two will be multiplied by 3, and then
player two will be given the option to keep the money or send it back to player one.
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The game proxies trust and trustworthiness between individuals. In treated sessions,
individuals will be exposed to videos depicting either fatal or non-fatal police violence
before playing the trust game. The experiment will asses how exposure to depictions
of police violence affects interpersonal trust as captured by play in the trust game.
One could also think of potential other projects that would combine the methods
of chapter one with the subject matter of chapter two. Complaints against officers
and attendance and participation at community meetings are a form of bottom-up
monitoring of officers. Officers can also be monitored by review boards that have
top-down authority over departments. Combining this top-down and bottom-up ap-
proach for departments could provide both new evidence for the effectiveness of one
monitoring scheme versus the other. Such a set up would also allow for an examina-
tion of which strategies are effective at fostering trust and producing better policing
outcomes.
These additions and limitations aside, this dissertation provides new insights on
the interplay between trust in an institution and engagement. When disincentivized
to participate because of an ancillary monitoring scheme or lost trust, individuals
cease to engage with each respective institution. In addition to contributing new
evidence to the economics literature on grassroots monitoring and policing, this work
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The following tables present additional results from chapter two not included in the
text or subsequent tables. The chapter two appendix concludes with a extensions to
the model of pro-social behavior.
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Table A.1: Effect of Grassroots Monitoring on Missing Expenses, Engineering Team FE
Dependent variable: Percent Missing Expenses
All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invitations and Comments -0.029 -0.083** 0.024 -0.052 -0.095** 0.001
(0.032) (0.039) (0.050) (0.036) (0.042) (0.053)
Mean 0.252 0.303 0.192 0.252 0.303 0.192
Observations 477 253 224 477 253 224
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Engineer FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
P-value (No audit=Audit) 0.09 0.24
Note— Results come from estimating equation (1). “P-value (No audit=Audit)” refers to the p-
value on the interaction term of audit treatment and the treatment of comments and invitations.
Stratum (subdistrict) fixed effects are included in the first three estimations and engineer fixed
effects are included in the last three estimations. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
columns (1)-(3) and at the subdistrict level in columns (4)-(6). *, **, *** denotes significant at
10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
93
Table A.2: Effect of Grassroots Monitoring on Missing Expenses, All Distribution Methods
Dependent variable: Percent Missing Expenses
All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invitations and Comments -0.021 -0.041 0.003 -0.028 -0.047 0.001
(0.027) (0.033) (0.045) (0.027) (0.032) (0.043)
Mean 0.252 0.303 0.192 0.252 0.303 0.192
Observations 477 253 224 477 253 224
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Engineer FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
P-value (No audit=Audit) 0.44 0.50
Note— Results come from estimating version of equation (1) that does not separate by school
distribution (i.e., Yij = α1 + α2ICij + δj + εij , where all terms are defined as in equation (1)
in the text). “P-value (No audit=Audit)” refers to the p-value on the interaction term of audit
treatment and the treatment of comments and invitations. Stratum (subdistrict) fixed effects
are included in the first three estimations and engineer fixed effects are included in the last three
estimations. Standard errors clustered at the village level in columns (1)-(3) and at the subdistrict
level in columns (4)-(6). *, **, *** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table A.3: Effect of Grassroots Monitoring on Missing Expenses, Alternative Outcome
Dependent variable: Percent Missing Expenses
in Roads and Ancillary Projects
All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invitations and Comments -0.067** -0.090* -0.046 -0.069* -0.106** -0.036
(0.032) (0.046) (0.044) (0.035) (0.044) (0.049)
Mean 0.247 0.291 0.199 0.247 0.291 0.199
Observations 538 281 257 538 281 257
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes No No No
Engineer FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
P-value (No audit=Audit) 0.49 0.50
Note— Results come from estimating equation (1). “P-value (No audit=Audit)” refers to the
p-value on the interaction term of audit treatment and the treatment of comments and invitations.
Stratum (subdistrict) fixed effects are included in the first three estimations and engineer fixed
effects are included in the last three estimations. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
columns (1)-(3) and at the subdistrict level in columns (4)-(6). *, **, *** denotes significant at
10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively
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Table A.4: Effect on Attendance and Active Participation by Audit Status, Distribution via Schools
Attendance of Nonelite Number of Nonelite who talk
All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Invitations and Comments 11.972*** 12.358*** 11.478*** 0.231** 0.361** 0.086
(1.476) (2.241) (1.881) (0.097) (0.160) (0.106)
Mean 24.331 27.358 20.353 0.966 1.045 0.863
Observations 1,657 889 768 1,657 889 768
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value (No audit=Audit) 0.76 0.15
Note— Results come from estimating equation (1) with the dependent variables the participation vari-
ables shown in the first row. The p-values are calculated from regressions of the dependent variables
on the interaction of not being audited and the treatment of comments and invitations. Data are taken
from the meeting survey. The results are estimated for all villages, villages that were audited and villages
that were not audited. Each observation is a single village meeting. Stratum (subdistrict) fixed effects
are included; since audit is constant within a subdistrict, the audit variable is automatically captured by
the stratum fixed effect. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village
level. *, **, *** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table A.5: Effect on Meetings by Audit Status, Distribution via Schools
Number of Any Corruption Serious
Problems Related Problem Response Taken
All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit All No Audit Audit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Invitations and Comments -0.045 0.028 -0.135 0.035** 0.056** 0.012 0.000 0.017 -0.020*
(0.069) (0.094) (0.102) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011)
Mean 1.172 1.160 1.186 0.062 0.075 0.047 0.026 0.038 0.013
Observations 1,665 896 769 1,665 896 769 1,665 896 769
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Meeting FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value (No audit=Audit) 0.24 0.13 0.03
Note— Results come from estimating equation (1), with the dependent variables the outcome of meetings shown in the first row.
The p-values are calculated from regressions of the dependent variables on the interaction of not being audited and the treatment
of comments and invitations. Data are taken from the meeting survey. The results are estimated for all villages, villages that were
audited and villages that were not audited. Each observation represents one village. “Serious response” is defined as agreeing to
replace a supplier or village office, agreeing that money should be returned, agreeing to an internal village investigation, asking
for help from district project officials, or requesting an external audit. Estimation is by OLS. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses, adjusted for clustering by village. *, **, *** denotes significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.“RI P-value”
refers to the p-value calculated using randomization inference.
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Table A.6: Audit versus Grassroots, Alternative Outcome
Dependent variable: Percent Missing Expenses
in Roads and Ancillary Projects
(1) (2) (3)
Audit -0.094* -0.093* -0.097*
(0.050) (0.052) (0.055)
Invitations and Comments -0.075* -0.088* -0.087*
(0.044) (0.048) (0.051)
P-value (α2 = α3) 0.711 0.931 0.876
Observations 538 538 538
Mean dependent variable 0.25 0.25 0.25
Stratum FE Yes No No
Engineer FE No Yes No
Note— “P-value (α2 = α3)” refers to the p-value from test of equality between coef-
ficients on “Invitations and Comments" and "Audit". Column (1) uses audit stratum
(district) fixed effects. Column (2) uses engineering team fixed effects. Column (3)
uses no fixed effects. All specification use standard errors clustered at the subdistrict
level (level of randomization for audit treatment). *, **, *** denotes significant at
10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
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A.2 Model Extensions
Assume that the individual is an expected utility maximizer. When corruption is
deterred the individual receives public gain ξ > 0, this can be thought of as the
utility gain from a higher quality road or public good. Participation carries a cost
c > 0 but can bring private utility gain λ ≥ 0 which can be interpreted as “warm glow”
received from engaging in pro-social behavior. Assume that the individual can choose
his degree of participation p ∈ [0, 1] with p closer to 1 meaning full participation and
engagement. In deciding how much to participate, the individual assesses that the
probability that corruption will be deterred conditional on his degree of participation
p and audit intensity a ∈ [0, 1] is given by φa,p. The optimization problem of the
individual is thus given by:
max
p
φa,p[ξ + λ(p)− c(p)] + (1− φa,p)[λ(p)− c(p)] (A.1)
where it is assumed that the participation costs and private gains from participation
depend on the degree of participation p. Furthermore, assume that benefits are
concave and increasing in participation (λ′(p) > 0, λ′′(p) < 0) and costs are convex
and increasing in participation (c′(p) > 0, and c′′(p) > 0). Differentiating (A.1), one
obtains first order condition:
λ′(p)− c′(p) + ξ ∂φa,p
∂p
= 0 (A.2)












Therefore, the effect of audit intensity on the equilibrium level of participation will
be negative as long as ∂φa,p
∂p∂a
< 0.1 In essence, this conclusion is actually the continuous
version of the condition described in the main text, i.e., that the individual lowers
his participation if: ∆φ1 −∆φ0 = (φ1,1 − φ1,0)− (φ0,1 − φ0,0) < 0. This implies that
participation will decrease if the individual believes that higher audit intensity lowers
the marginal contribution of his participation.
1Plausible assuming that participation has diminishing returns on the likelihood of deterrence
(e.g., the return to an additional corruption complaint becomes smaller after a number of similar




B.1 Additional Information on Data
The following section gives more detailed information on the data used in above anal-
yses. Figure 3.9 shows that there is not a significant probability mass on zero which
means that the data does not require a count model to attain unbiased estimates.
Nevertheless, I present estimates using a count model in the subsequent section.
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This table depicts the coding for the responses to the Gallup Confidence in Insti-
tutions survey.





“Quite a lot" 3
“A great deal" 4
Surveyors ask individuals how much confidence they have in several institutions within the US. The
responses range from “A great deal" on the high end to “Very Little" on the low end. Any response
“None" arises from the individual as is not one of the options the surveyor is instructed to give. I
code the responses according to the numeric values to their right.
The following table summarizes the various data sources I use and their purposes:
Table B.2: Data Usage Table
Source Function
Fatal Encounters Explanatory Variable
Gallup Confidence in Institutions Survey Outcome Variable; Controls
UCR Violent Crime Reports Control
Chicago 911 Call Data Outcome
Chicago Police Complaints Outcome




Below I present tables with count models, leads and lags, and marginal effects.
B.2.1 Count Models
The below table estimates equation 3.7 using a count model rather than a panel
regression.
Table B.3: 911 Calls (Count Models)
911 Calls (by Police District)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
callvolume
Fatal Encounter -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pct_white -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pct_black -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pct_NA 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pct_Asian -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pct_Hispanic 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




Crime NO NO YES Yes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
The above table reruns the original analysis using a count model. There are no fixed effects to avoid
the incidental parameters problem.
Though the magnitude of the Countdt variable is lower in the count model than
in the classic panel specification, qualitatively the results are nearly identical.
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B.2.2 Leads and Lags
The follow table show the regression output while estimating equation 3.7 with leads
and lags. The results are qualitatively similar to those shown in figure 3.10
Table B.4: 911 Calls with Leads and Lags
911 Calls (by Police District)









Crime Rate 979.78∗∗∗ 984.84∗∗∗ 979.91∗∗∗ 979.23∗∗∗
(140.33) (140.54) (140.09) (140.10)
Pct_white -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Pct_black -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Pct_NA 5.66∗∗ 5.63∗∗ 5.78∗∗ 5.79∗∗
(2.28) (2.28) (2.27) (2.27)
Pct_Asian -0.53∗∗ -0.53∗∗ -0.53∗∗ -0.53∗∗
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Pct_Hispanic 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 159.92∗∗∗ 159.53∗∗∗ 159.79∗∗∗ 159.87∗∗∗
(22.07) (22.09) (22.05) (22.04)
Crime NO NO YES Yes
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
This table re-estimates the main model using leads and lags.ll models contain crime and race controls.
Here only the call volume only falls on the day of the fatal encounter. There are
no statistically significant effects on the preceding or succeeding days.
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B.3 Effects Outside the District
This section explores the effects fatal encounter have outside the district where they
occur.
Table B.5: 911 Calls Outside the District








ymean 178.51 178.51 178.51
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
This table looks at effects outside the specific district. All models contain crime and race controls.
Outside the district in the absence of controls, there is no statistically significant
response.
Table B.6: 911 Calls Outside District (with Race Controls)








ymean 178.51 178.51 178.51
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
This table looks at effects outside the specific district.All models contain crime and race controls.
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The addition of district level race controls does not qualitatively change the results.
However, the results do change some when I interact district level race controls with
the amended fatal encounters variable.
Table B.7: Fatal Encounters and Race Interaction
911 Calls (by Police District)
(1) (2) (3)












Average Call Volume 178.51 178.51 178.51
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.51, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
This table interacts the fatal encounter variable with a variable that denotes whether or not a police
district is predominantly Black. All models contain crime and race controls.
After a fatal encounter, the general effect is negative and statistically significant.
The magnitude of this effect increases for shootings of Black individuals 1. Unlike the
results for fatal encounters in a district, the interaction term is positive. Thus, the
call volume rises, relative to that of affected, non-Black districts. This effect on call
volume increases for shootings by just more than 1.5 calls. For shootings of Black
individuals, the increase relative to fatal encounters is just over 2 calls. A summation
of the effects of being in a Black district, a shooting of a Black individual outside the
district, and the interaction term yields a negative number. In other words, despite
1The effect is insignificant for shootings of all individuals.
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the positive interaction term, the overall effect of being in a Black district for any
Black individual in the city is a decrease in call volume. It is important to note that
this fall in call volume is not nearly as large as the fall in call volume within the
police district where the shooting occurs. Taken together this evidence suggests that
there is a geographic component to the effect of a fatal encounter on call volume.
Even in the same city, fatal encounters within a particular district have more of an
effect on the district’s call volume than fatal encounters throughout the entire city. In
fact, without controlling for the predominant race in a district there is no statistically
significant effect on call volume.
Laquan McDonald: The Costs
To assess the the potential welfare costs associated with the long-term effects of the
release of the dash cam footage, I perform a back of the envelope calculation in the
following table.
Table B.8: Costs of Loss CTA Revenue
Loss CTA Revenue
Daily Loss Weekly Loss Monthly Loss Yearly Loss
−$5, 272.5 −$36, 097.5 −$158, 175 −$1, 924, 462.5
This details the loss CTA revenue after Laquan McDonald’s death
I find the daily loss by multiplying the ride cost by the number of daily rides lost.
I then multiply the daily loss by seven to attain the weekly loss. The monthly loss
and yearly loss come from multiplying the daily loss total by 30 and 365 respectively.
It is important to note that these totals are for a single police district for one year.
Summing across the 19 police districts with CTA stations, this number becomes about
a $36.6 million loss for one year.
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B.4 Model of Police Use
Below I present the following model of police engagement. There are two heteroge-
neous, representative agents w and b who can expend can choose a continuous level
of police engagement e ∈ [0, 1]. Where 0 is a complete refusal to engage with police
and 1 is full engagement. The cost of engagement is modeled by the function c(e)
that is:
1. increasing in e
2. has a first derivative c′(e) > 0
3. has a second derivative c”(e) > 0
4. the cost is the same for both agents 2
There are two states of the world H, where the police respond to the agent’s call
and are helpful, and F , where the police either do not respond to the agent’s call or
produce a negative outcome for the respondent 3. Thus, H > 0 and F < 0. The
probability that an agent is in state H is given by pi where pw > pb. Thus, when
deciding the optimal level of police engagement, an agent will maximize the following:
max
e
pi[H(e)− ci(e)] ≥ (1− pi)[F (e)− ci(e)] (B.1)
Thus, the first order condition is:
pi[H − c′i(e)] ≥ (1− pi)[F − c′i(e)] = 0 (B.2)
Rearranging terms yields the following the following equation:
2I will later relax this assumption
3This negative response could be false accusations, false arrests, excessive force, or even of fatal
force. The negative police interaction could be directed at the caller specifically or other members
of the community
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c′(e∗) = pi(H − F ) + F (B.3)
Because pw > pb the optimal level of engagement e∗b < e∗w.
B.4.1 Fatal Encounters as Shocks
Probability Affecting Shocks
Assuming knowledge of a fatal encounter between police and an individual that iden-
tifies as part of one’s group lowers the probability that one is in state H, then the
condition pw > pb becomes pw >> pb. In other words, the probability of ending up
with an adverse outcome from calling the police has increased for type b agents 4.
The optimization will be the same, though the right side of equation 3 will be smaller
such that e∗b will be less than e∗i. Therefore, type b agents’ optimal level of police
engagement will decrease.
Potential Other Effects
It is possible that fatal encounters could affect either the cost of engagement or the
values of each state for agents of type b. In other words after a fatal encounter, a
type b agent may face two states of the world where H ≥ 0 and F << 0 which would
result again in a decrease in the optimal level of engagement.
It is also possible that the cost function could change after a fatal encounter such
that conditions 2 or 3 become c′(e) >> 0 or c′(e) >> 0 5. Either case will lead to less
police engagement in the optimum because engagement is more costly.
4One could consider the case where pb is so low that it can be “shocked" no further. Thus, there
would be no material change in the original model.
5Note that the case where both 2 and 3 change is merely a special case of the either or example.
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